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Several FOQA parameters that could enhance air carrier safety have not been recorded 
and/or analyzed. Airlines have traditionally chosen a limited number of parameters for 
analysis (thousands have been available for recording). No study in the U.S. had 
addressed FOQA parameters, leading to an exploratory mixed methods study. A 
conference call comprising FOQA industry experts was planned and completed to (a) 
increase researcher knowledge and (b) discuss a list of improved safety FOQA 
parameters. A questionnaire, derived from the suggested list, was electronically sent to 40 
FOQA professionals. The respondents represented 75% of the airlines with an FAA-
approved FOQA program. The quantitative and qualitative responses reported a high 
importance for the 11 suggested parameters (confidence level from 0 to 100; M= 82.79, 
SD = 14.05). The industry indicated amenability to the discussion of improved safety 
parameters. The addressing of technical difficulties, combined with further studies/ 
debates, has been recommended. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1970s, new cockpit procedures and technology have been emphasized to 
improve safety within the worldwide air carrier community. From the early 1930s, safety 
changes had been driven largely by accident investigation, a reactive safety approach. 
The early years' mantra of "fly it, crash it, redesign it, fly it, crash it. . ." (Walters, 2004, 
p. 2) has evolved to include operational explorations (a proactive safety approach) via the 
implementation of Voluntary Safety Programs (VSPs). Among these primarily U.S. 
VSPs, the most popular program utilizing quantitative data has been Flight Operational 
Quality Assurance (FOQA). Worldwide, a number of airlines have also adopted FOQA 
or its equivalent (Wood & Sweginnis, 2006). 
FOQA programs, also known as Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) and Flight Data 
Analysis (FDA), have allowed "operators to gain a deeper understanding of their flight 
operations, through regularly analyzing flight data from their aircraft" (Vaz Fernandes, 
2002, pp. 1-2). The program has contributed greatly to aviation safety by providing 
quantifiable aircraft operations information on normal and non-normal conditions and 
events that take place during routine air carrier activities. Data recorded from sensors 
installed on airplanes have helped airlines to act proactively to increase the level of safety 
while also helping to diminish operational costs in a highly competitive market. 
Nevertheless, the primary objective of FOQA has been safety improvement. Therefore, 
the focus of this research was to analyze what parameters might optimize the monitoring 
and recording of data to maximize aviation safety. 
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Background and Significance 
Air transportation has become vital to the world economy. Although it has been 
considered one of the safest modes of transport, the potential loss of human lives and 
transported goods has motivated the industry to continuously develop new procedures 
and technologies, such as FOQA, to minimize losses caused by accidents. 
Aviation Safety 
The efforts of aviation pioneers, who studied aerodynamics, built, and then tested 
their inventions, eventually culminated in the first successful powered flight in 1903 by 
the Wright brothers. These early pioneers focused, and naturally so, on achieving 
successful flight. Safety was a secondary aim. As a result, many of them, such as 
Otto Lilienthal, died trying to achieve that goal. That was the price of progress in the 
beginning years of manned flight (Kane, 2003). 
Initially, because of the high number of accidents, flying had only interested 
adventurers. However, it was not long before economical opportunities, such as 
advertising, carrying mail, and transporting people, attracted entrepreneurs and other 
business professionals. Investments for aircraft development and airport infrastructure 
grew (Kane, 2003). As a result, safety became vital, not just to prevent aviation fatalities, 
but to also protect the growing financial investment being made in the burgeoning 
aviation industry. This led regulatory agencies in the industry to impose safety standards. 
Creating the first safety standards was a challenge due to the lack of knowledge 
about this topic. Consequently, research on accident causation became a necessity. 
Data collection was a problem with aircraft crashes because a destroyed airplane 
might not provide enough clues about the accident cause. Equipment that could record 
flight parameters during the moments leading up to a crash became a necessity. Several 
regulatory organizations have mandated such equipment, referred to as Flight Data 
Recorders (FDRs), on commercial aircraft. 
Current Level of Safety 
As stated by Boeing (n.d.), "flying is one of the safest modes of transportation" (^ | 
1). Figure 1 shows the rate of accidents per million departures and annual fatalities that 
have occurred since 1959. Advances in safety science resulted in large decreases in the 
annual accident rates, while industry regulators were codifying standards for FDRs -
which became obligatory equipment on commercial jets (Withers, 2007). The FDRs 
provided pertinent accident data, resulting in improved aviation accident investigations, 
which led to improved recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. 
50 
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Figure 1. Accident Rates per Departures and Onboard Fatalities by Year: 1959-2006 
(Adapted from Boeing, 2007). 
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Boeing (n.d.) reported that "thirty years ago, fatal accidents on commercial 
jetliners occurred approximately once in every 140 million miles flown. Today, it's [sic] 
1.4 billion miles flown for every fatal accident - a ten-fold safety improvement" (1| 9). 
Nevertheless, acceptance of the current level of safety has been questioned because the 
number of passengers, and consequently the number of flights, is expected to continually 
increase in the U.S., as shown in Figure 2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
(2007) has determined that even if the rate of accidents per million departures remains 
constant, the number of accidents will increase. 
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Figure 2. Passengers Enplanements in Millions (Data from FAA, 2007). 
The rise of the number of accidents has not been acceptable; thus, new prevention 
techniques have become indispensable. VSPs, such as FOQA, became necessary to 
improve safety. Consequently, regulatory agencies around the world have been offering 
incentives to airlines to adopt these programs. 
Proactive Safety 
Traditionally, data used to improve safety have been collected from accident sites. 
Aircraft wreckage, air traffic control records, flight plan, witness or survivals interviews, 
and FDR records have been the primary sources of information available to accident 
investigators (Wood & Sweginnis, 2006). 
The main drawback with reactive prevention methods has been that the data for 
potential new hazards and problems became available only after an accident occurred. 
Furthermore, the consequence of falling accident rates has meant even less data have 
been available from accidents from which to make additional safety improvements. 
Figure 3 has sought to illustrate how data have been historically collected. Far more 
safety recommendations have been generated from the data from incidents and accidents 
than have been derived from work errors. "While fatal accidents are extremely rare and 
incidents of injury and minor damage occur occasionally, near-misses and work errors 
can take place on a daily basis" (McVenes & Chidester, 2005, p. 3). 
Figure 3. Available Information versus Events (Adapted from McVenes & Chidester, 
2005). 
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According to the Swiss cheese model of accident causation developed by Reason 
(1997), accidents have been the consequence of the sum of minor errors that have 
happened in sequence, characterized as work errors or events. McVenes and Chidester 
(2005) posited that this type of 'unexplored data,' if investigated, could reduce the rate of 
accidents by reducing small errors; among their justifications were: 
1. 'There is relatively little information about those errors, in contrast to what is 
learned from accidents" (p. 3). 
2. "This thirst for information about work errors and hazards was the genesis of 
the safety initiatives many airlines have now adopted" (p. 3). 
3. VSPs "can help the airline industry detect hazards and vulnerabilities in our 
air transportation system" (p. 4). 
There have been seven VSPs established within the U.S. aviation system (Farrow, 
2007): 
1. Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). 
2. Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP). 
3. Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP). 
4. Internal Evaluation Program (IEP). 
5. Flight Operation Quality Assurance (FOQA). 
6. Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). 
7. Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA). 
Ballough (2002) reported that "all of the top ten U.S. airlines (representing 90% 
of the passenger carrying capacity in the U.S.) operate at least one such program" (p. 4), 
which might indicate that safety has been moving toward a higher level. The interaction 
of FOQA with some of these programs has produced valuable data for preventing 
accidents. 
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Safety has not been relegated to a single department, but has relied on the 
participation of the entire corporation. This concept, called Safety Management System 
(SMS), has demonstrated the necessity of new practices to reduce accidents, incidents, 
and minor daily errors. The FAA (2006b) has defined SMS as follows: 
An SMS is essentially a quality management approach to controlling risk. It also 
provides the organizational framework to support a sound safety culture. . . 
Modern management and safety oversight practices are moving increasingly 
toward a systems approach that concentrates more on control of processes rather 
than efforts targeted toward extensive inspection and remedial actions on end 
products, (p. 2) 
The raison d'etre of aviation SMSs has been the discovery of precursors to events that 
might lead to incidents. 
The VSPs and the SMS have complemented the reactive approach to safety. The 
FAA (2006b) corroborated this by stating "the best approach to problems of increased 
aviation activity and decreased resources is to bring safety efforts into the normal 
management framework of aviation operations" (p. 2). 
The Foundation of FOQA 
FDRs, commonly known as "black-boxes," became mandatory in the early years 
of passenger transportation due to the lack of knowledge about accident causation and 
safety hazards. FAA regulators had mandated that FDRs, also called crash survival 
recorders, be installed in all commercial fleets to record a list of pre-established 
parameters that would provide relevant aircraft accident data. 
Some companies took this mandate as an opportunity to use the recorded flight 
data to improve their operations and established Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) programs 
(Withers, 2007). The operators' objectives have been to combine aircraft data with "other 
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sources and operational experiences to develop objective information to enhance safety, 
training effectiveness, operational procedures, maintenance and engineering procedures, 
and air traffic control (ATC) procedures" (FAA, 2004, p. 5). 
FOQA has been summarized as (a) capturing data provided by many sensors in 
the airplane, (b) recording data in a digital format, (c) downloading the recorded 
information from the airplane, and (d) conducting posterior analysis to implement any 
necessary adjustments. The goal of FOQA safety personnel has been the constant search 
for pre-established events and exceedances that can be used to detect and correct issues at 
companies' operations (FAA, 2004). 
Although FOQA has been in existence for more than four decades in some 
European airlines (Vaz Fernandes, 2002), it has only been within the last decade that the 
program became widely adopted worldwide. This was attributed to technological 
advances made in airplane recording equipment; progress was accelerated by the mandate 
for FDRs to record a larger number of aircraft parameters. 
Significantly more parameters were able to be recorded with the advent of digital 
technology in airplanes. Although thousand of parameters have been available to FOQA 
programs, there has been no consensus on what parameters - other than the required ones 
- should be monitored by FOQA. (Different parameter lists have been created by 
regulators, manufacturers, and software providers.) 
Several studies have addressed the FOQA program (Teixeira, 2006; 
Vaz Fernandez, 2002; Wu, 2005) and its technical characteristics and implementation by 
the airlines. There have been no U.S. studies published on (a) which parameters would 
potentially contribute to safety improvement and (b) which parameters should be 
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recorded. A study and its conclusions that resulted in additional parameters being 
monitored and recorded could contribute to further reduction in the rate of aviation 
accidents. 
Statement of the Problem 
The modern airplane's digital bus has had thousands of parameters available for 
FOQA monitoring. However, airlines have historically analyzed a small number of the 
available parameters, focusing on those that have (a) been traditionally chosen for 
analysis and (b) enhanced efficiency of operations. As a result, a number of parameters 
(the analysis of which might lead to air carrier safety improvements) have not been 
recorded and/or analyzed. 
The Purpose Statement 
The intent of this exploratory study was to identify FOQA parameters that have 
not been widely used, whether by choice or not, to improve safety. Its secondary aim was 
to inform the aviation industry about the significance of discussing, and ultimately 
adopting, new FOQA parameters to enhance flight safety. 
Delimitations 
The following three delimitations existed throughout the design and completion of 
the study: 
1. Only U.S. airlines were involved. Their purposive selection was made via 
industry contacts from the expert advisors and members of the Thesis 
Committee. 
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2. The parameter list, albeit approved by the group of experts, was primarily 
based on the technology philosophy of only one of the four major aircraft 
manufacturers, Boeing. 
3. Although the cost for recording new parameters has been an important issue, 
it was not evaluated for this study. This choice was made because of the 
possible influence cost might have had on the gathering of expert input 
regarding the ideal parameters based solely on safety. 
Definition of Terms 
Throughout the study, many terms associated with FOQA have been utilized. The 
following definitions have been developed to assist the readers. 
Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC): "The ARINC organization is the technical, 
publishing, and administrative support arm of the Airlines Electronic Engineering 
Committee (AEEC) groups. AEEC standards define avionics form, fit, function, 
and interfaces" (UTRS, 2005 as cited in Wu, 2005, p. 7). 
Airplane Condition Monitoring System (ACMS): "A unit located in the aircraft's 
electronic and electrical compartment with the primary function of retrieving data 
from the FDAU, allowing for the creation of aircraft condition reports such as 
engine health monitoring" (Wu, 2005, p. 7). 
Black-Box: The popular name given to CVRs, FDRs, and their variations (Author). 
Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR): "A device that records any radio transmissions and 
conversations from the flight deck using an area microphone" (Wu, 2005, p. 8). 
Concatenation: The process of joining two different variables (e.g., two frames) to form a 
new variable (Author). 
Corporate FOQA (C-FOQA): An adaptation of the airline's FOQA program to smaller 
business jets (Lacagnina, 2007). 
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Data Frame: "A 'data frame' converts physical airplane data into coded digital data 
stream in the DFDR" (Withers, 2007, p. 15) 
Data Management Unit (DMU): "A powerful data processor designed to perform 
airframe/engine and flight performance monitoring and analysis" (UTRS, 2005 as 
cited in Wu, 2005, p. 8). 
Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit (DFDAU): "A unit that acquires aircraft data via a 
digital data bus and analog inputs, and formats that information for output to the 
flight data recorder in accordance with requirements of regulatory agencies. In 
addition to the mandatory function, many DFDAUs have a second processor and 
memory module that enables it to perform a limited amount of ACMS 
functions/reports. The DFDAU can provide data and pre-defined reports to the 
cockpit printer, or display for the flight crew, or directly to other devices for 
transmittal to the ground, or to a QAR for recording/storage of raw flight data" 
(UTRS, 2005 as cited in Wu, 2005, p. 8). 
Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR): A digital improvement of the FDR (Author). 
Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorder (EAFR): EAFR addresses combinations of any or all 
of the following, (a) a DFDR function, (b) a CVR function, (c) a data link 
recording function, and (d) an image recording function in a single Line 
Replaceable Unit (LRU). In new airplanes, the EAFR records data provided by the 
digital bus in a single unit (Withers, 2007). 
Flight Data Acquisition Unit (FDAU): "A device that acquires aircraft data via a digital 
data bus and analog inputs and formats the data for output to the Flight Data 
Recorder (FDR) according to regulatory requirements" (Wu, 2005, p. 9). 
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Flight Data Analysis (FDA): "Flight Data Analysis (FDA) is the systematic collection of 
flight data to improve safety and operational efficiency" (I AT A, 2004, Tjl as quoted 
in Teixeira, 2006, p. 8). 
Flight Data Monitoring (FDM): "Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) is the systematic, pro-
active, and non-punitive use of digital flight data from routine operations to 
improve aviation safety" (CAA, 2003, p. 1 as quoted in Teixeira, 2006, p. 8). 
Flight Data Recorder (FDR): An analog unit "that records pertinent parameters and 
technical information about a flight. At a minimum, it records those parameters 
required by the governing regulatory agency, but may record a much higher 
number of parameters. . . [It] is designed to withstand the forces of a crash so that 
its information may be used to reconstruct the circumstances leading up to the 
accident" (UTRS, 2005 as cited in Wu, 2005, p. 8). For the purpose of this 
research, FDR was used as a generic reference for FDRs, DFDRs, and SSFRDs. 
Flight Operation Quality Assurance (FOQA): "A voluntary program for the routine 
collection and analysis of flight operational data to provide more information 
about, and greater insight into, the total flight operations environment. A FOQA 
program combines these data with other sources and operational experience to 
develop objective information to enhance safety, training effectiveness, operational 
procedures, maintenance and engineering procedures, and air traffic control (ATC) 
procedures" (FAA, 2004, p. 4). 
FOQA, FDM, or FDA: "Different acronyms for aviation safety programs that make use 
of digital, recorded aircraft flight data, even if no accident occurs" (Teixeira, 2006, 
p. 9). 
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General Aviation FOQA (G-FOQA): The utilization of FOQA methodology to improve 
safety of general aviation (Author). 
Ground Data Replay and Analysis System (GDRAS): "Power software with programs 
designed to transform airborne recorded data into a usable form for analysis, 
process and scan selected flight data parameters, compare recorded or calculated 
values to predetermined norms using event algorithms, and generate exceedance 
reports for review or trending when exceedances are found" (UTRS, 2005 as cited 
in Wu, 2005, p. 9). 
Line Replaceable Unit (LRU): A component designed to be replaced quickly at the flight-
line or airport ramp area (Wikipedia Encyclopedia, 2008). 
Metrics: The state of a system or a component in an airplane, such as the propulsion, the 
navigation, the autopilot, the communication, and the flight control system. To 
comprehend the system's condition in a selected time, many parameters (sensors' 
data) could be necessarily recorded for each desired metric (Author). For the 
purpose of this study, metrics have generally been referred to as parameters. 
Parameters: Individual "measurable variables that supply information about the status of 
an aircraft system or subsystem, position, or operating environment. Parameters are 
collected by a data acquisition unit installed on the aircraft and then sent to analysis 
and reporting systems" (FAA, 2004, p. 5). Engineers have been calling parameters 
each datum that can be provided by each sensor in the airplane (Author). 
Proactive Safety or New Method: The reactive safety method (in which improvements are 
made based on data provided by accident investigations) complemented by 
proactive programs - such as Voluntary Safety Programs (VSPs) and Safety 
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Management Systems (SMS) - that have had as their objective to correct daily 
operational errors that can potentially lead to accidents (Author). 
Quick Access Recorder (QAR): "A recording unit onboard the aircraft that stores flight-
recorded data. These units are designed to provide quick and easy access to a 
removable medium, such as an optical disk or PCMCIA card, on which flight 
information is recorded. QARs have now been developed to record an expanded 
data frame, sometimes supporting 2000+ parameters at much higher sample rates 
than the FDR. The expanded data-frame greatly increases the resolution and 
accuracy of the ground analysis programs (UTRS, 2005 as cited in Wu, 2005, p. 
10). 
Reactive Safety or Traditional Method: Improvements are made based on data provided 
by accident investigations - using tools such as DFRDs and interrogatories - in 
which "the country's accident investigation authority would take a close look at 
what went wrong and issue recommendations to the regulator, aircraft 
manufacturer, airline, etc. to fix the probable cause of the accident" (McVenes & 
Chidester, 2005, p. 2). 
Safety: In this research, the word safety was used to specifically express the aviation 
safety. 
Safety Culture: A supportive culture, which provides "climate for non-punitive 
performance-monitoring, measurable reporting from front line employees about 
hazards encountered, and feedback concerning the corrective actions taken by the 
organization" (McVenes & Chidester, 2005, p. 6). 
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Safety Management System (SMS): "The effective and comprehensive safety structure 
developed and maintained by an air transport organization for managing safety, 
through an inclusive safety culture" (CAA, 2003 as cited in Teixeira, 2006, p. 10). 
Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR): "A DFDR that utilizes solid-state memory for 
recording flight data" (UTRS, 2005 as cited in Wu, 2005, p. 10). 
Stakeholders: The FAA (2004) defined stakeholders as "constituencies that are potential 
users of FOQA data and that have a stake in the program's success" (p. 6). Pearce 
and Robinson (2007) defined stakeholders as "influential people who are vitally 
interested in the actions of the business" (p. G-6). 
Subframe: A subdivision of a data frame which represents one second; a data frame is 
composed of four subframes (Author). 
Universal Flight Data Acquisition Unit: A FDAU evolution which accepted both analog 
and digital inputs (Withers, 2007). 
Voluntary Aviation Safety Information-Sharing Process (VASIP): The instrument 
developed by the ARC "to collect, share safety-related information, and to use that 
information to proactively identify, analyze, and correct safety issues that affect 
commercial aviation" (Chidester, 2007, p. 1). 
Voluntaiy Safety Programs (VSPs): Programs - voluntarily implemented by air carriers -
that have as their objectives to increase the level of safety through the utilization of 
the proactive safety (Author). 
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Chapter II 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
FDRs, mandated by regulators since the early years of air transportation, 
constantly recorded flight data provided by sensors located throughout the structure of an 
aircraft. However, the recorded data were retrieved and analyzed only when an accident 
took place. 
Some pioneering companies in Europe perceived the opportunity to regularly 
download and analyze these data to improve their operations, resulting in the first 
attempts of a FOQA program. Since then, the technology has evolved to facilitate the 
acquisition, recording, and downloading of data, establishing FOQA as an important 
component of both aviation safety and air carrier economics. 
FDRs and FDM 
In Chapter I, Figure 1 illustrated how FDRs, associated with other techniques, 
contributed to the decrease in the accident rate between 1960 and 1980. For decades 
FDRs were exclusively used as providers of accident data. Since 1962, recorded 
parameters from FDRs have been adopted as contributors to air carriers"' daily operations 
through the FOQA program. 
Background 
The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) has been known to be as old as the airplane. The 
first FDR, installed by the Wright Brothers on their original airplane in 1903, recorded 
engine RPM, time, and distance traveled (Wood & Sweginnis, 2006). Some other 
pioneers, such as Charles Lindbergh, recorded some sort of flight data in rudimentary 
17 
equipment later. Withers (2006) reported that "none of these recorders could protect the 
flight data in the event of a crash" (p. 4). The growth of the number of aircraft, the 
introduction of jet airliners, and the growth of the number of potential accidents have led 
to the necessity of reliable FDRs (Withers). 
Some prototypes, which used different concepts and materials, were developed 
around the world. The first practical model had metal as its recording media, which 
provided crash survivability. It has worked similar to an "oscillograph"; 
They received input signals from the airplane, converted them into a needle 
deflection, and scribed the data onto a moving foil strip using diamond tipped 
needles. A typical foil cartridge could hold about 100 to 400 hours of flight data. 
(Withers, 2006, p. 7) 
These FDRs were very limited because "they could hold only very few 
parameters [, and] the foil recorder was inoperative in approximately half of the 
crashes investigated" (Withers, 2006, p. 7). When available, the data from an accident 
were compressed into only 0.1 inch of the recorded tracing; microscopes, precision 
measures, and some interpretation were required for its analysis, which decreased the 
investigation reliability. Additionally, the foil cartridge needed to be replaced often since 
it was not rewritable (Withers). A better technology was necessary. 
In the 1960s, advances in the magnetic tape technology of the phonographic 
industry, made possible the crash survivable Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). The same 
technology was applied to the second widely adopted FDR model, the Digital Flight Data 
Recorder (DFDR), which had as its principal advantage the utilization of a digital format 
for data recording. "The development of digital FDRs improved both data collection and 
readout accuracy" (Wood & Sweginnis, 2006, p. 149) because (a) the number of possible 
recorded parameters increased from 6 to 34; and (b) the tape cartridge was rewritable, 
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more reliable, and produced much better quality data. Some of the DFDR weaknesses 
were (a) the tendency to wear in service, (b) the degradation of data quality with time, 
(c) the distortion or brake of the tape due to crash loads, (d) the difficulties to extract 
data, and (e) the failures during the download process (Withers, 2006, p. 7). 
In the 1990s, the phonographic industry started to use solid state media. This 
change generated a scarcity of magnetic tapes that challenged the aviation industry to 
develop a new DFDR, the Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR). Withers (2006) 
reported that "compared to tape DFDRs, SSFDRs can record at a higher data rate, 
provide better flight data, are more reliable, and require no periodic maintenance" (p. 7). 
Until 1972, one physical input (connector) was necessary for each parameter 
recorded in DFDRs or SSFDR; the recording capacity was limited by the physical space 
available for inputs on the equipment. Installing new inputs was also limited by the 
DFDR position; it has been typically stored in the airplane tail to increase the chances of 
survivability in the event of an accident. Consequently, for each new desired parameter, it 
was necessary to install a new wire from the nose to the tail of the airplane. 
The solution was a new LRU [(Line Replaceable Unit)] called the Flight Data 
Acquisition Unit (FDAU) that gathered airplane inputs together, and packaged the 
result into a digital multiplex (time division) data stream sent to a new type digital 
recorder that simply copies the incoming digital data. (Withers, 2007, p. 13) 
The FDAU has obtained analog signals, provided by sensors on different surfaces 
and equipment around the airplane, to send them to the DFDR via a digital bus. 
New parameters can usually be installed by adding new wiring from the sending 
system to the FDAU inside the avionics bay. . . . The update is completed by 
changing the FDAU software to accept the new data and send it to the DFDR in a 
new data frame. (Withers, 2007, p. 13) 
The Universal Flight Data Acquisition Unit (UFDAU), an FDAU evolution, 
accepted both analog and digital inputs. FDAUs and UFDAUs had some limitations: (a) 
19 
they were hardware configured, (b) the physical space available for analog connectors 
were limited, and (c) wires for analog signals needed to be installed from sensors to 
FDAU ports. The solution to these limitations "was to interconnect the airplane system, 
including recording system, with digital interface buses" (Withers, 2007, p. 13). 
Following ARINC 429 specifications, a sending unit organized outgoing data from 
sensors into labeled packages, and sent them via the digital bus to the Digital Flight Data 
Acquisition Unit (DFDAU). The DFDAU could not only receive digital data (thereby 
eliminating the physical connectors' limitation) but could also be reprogrammed via 
software and adapted to new necessities. Some models could even "read" the aircraft ID 
and configure itself to that specific data frame (Withers). 
Some air carriers proposed the utilization of the recorded flight data as an 
instrument that could potentially improve operations and maintenance analysis, 
establishing the first attempts at a Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) Program. "The FDAU 
concept was extended to support this need for routine analysis" (Withers, 2007, p. 13). 
FDAUs commonly had an auxiliary output port where data were duplicated. This 
auxiliary output port was used by those companies to send data to a Quick Access 
Recorder (QAR), which recorded the data sent by a FDAU using a technique similar to 
the one used by DFDRs. (Currently, the QAR has often been packaged with the FDAU, 
either by means of a port containing a PCMCIA slot, or as a separate external device.) 
The two major differences from DFDRs have been: (a) the QAR has not had a crash-
survivable location and protection, and (b) the access to the recording media, such as a 
magnetic tape, has been easily achieved via a door to the avionics compartment. 
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The method used to collect the data used in FDM programs has been varying 
depending upon the airplane type. Some airplanes have been using the QAR concept; 
others, such as the Boeing 747, had a secondary FDAU - called the Data Management 
Unit (DMU) - isolated from the mandatory system to provide data for routine analysis. 
Conversely, some B737s have combined the data used by FDM and the mandatory 
DFDR data in the same DFDAU (Withers, 2007). 
Because the DMU has allowed additional parameters to be recorded, the QAR has 
become the Digital Aircraft Condition Monitoring System (ACMS) Recorder (DAR; an 
ACMS discussion has been located later in Chapter II). Whereas the QARs have fed from 
the DFDR leads, they have only recorded the FAA-required parameters. The DAR has 
been able to be customized (i.e., new parameters have been added) without an FAA re-
certification (McDade, 1998). 
As airplanes - such as the Boeing 777 - evolved to the concept of integrated 
avionics, where most functions have been performed by software, the DFDAU has 
become the DFDAF, where the last "F" stands fox function in the software. However, 
these airplanes have continued to be equipped with a regular DFDR that has protected the 
data in the event of a crash (Withers, 2007). Additionally, Withers noted: 
The 787 takes avionics a step further to a server architecture that looks like the 
Ethernet system in your office. The 787 breaks from the traditional DFDR 
concept. Instead, the 787 has a new Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorder (EAFR) 
that reads the flight data off [sic] the Ethernet network. There is no recording 
system data acquisition function needed, (p. 14) 
Most of the changes that have historically occurred in the equipment technology 
have been driven by new recording media standards, the evolution of avionics, and the 
necessity for new parameters to be recorded to comply with regulations, and the necessity 
21 
of additional parameters for higher fidelity flight data analysis. (The historical context of 
these changes has not been detailed in this study.) 
Acquisition and Recording Equipment 
Since airplanes manufactured in the 1970s have continued to be operated, there 
has been a variation on how data have been recorded in the FDRs. The availability of the 
recorded data for FDM programs has also varied. However, a consolidated, basic purpose 
has been provided by the available acquisition and recording equipment. 
The following list provides a simplified description of the equipment related to 
FDM, as well as the principal functions. The list was compiled based on information 
provided by Vaz Fernandes (2002), Wu (2005), and Withers (2007). The name of the 
equipment tends to change depending on the manufacturer and the technology used. 
1. The Flight Data Recorder (FDR), the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR), 
and the Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR) are crash-survivable units 
that record data acquired from sensors (in older models), or from the DFDAU 
(in current airplanes). The main reason for the recorded data has been to 
provide information for accident investigations. 
2. The Flight Data Acquisition Unit (FDAU), the Universal Flight Data 
Acquisition Unit (UFDAU), the Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit 
(DFDAU), the Flight Data Interface Unit (FDIU), the Data Management Unit 
(DMU), the Flight Data Management Unit (FDMU), the Digital Flight Data 
Management Unit (DFDMU), and the Flight Data and Management System 
(FD AMS) have as their main functionality the acquisition of analog or digital 
data from sensors or sending units, and sending the data in a single stream of 
digital format to the DFDR using the data frame concept. The aforementioned 
units have been located in the avionics bay beneath the flight deck. 
3. The Quick Access Recorder (QAR), the Wireless Ground link Quick Access 
Recorder (WQAR), the miniQAR, and the DMU record data, similar to the 
DFDR, but have no crash survivability case. They have been located in the 
avionics bay beneath the flight deck for easier access and have recorded data 
in tape, diskette, magneto-optical, or PCMCIA media. The data acquired from 
these devices have been used in FDM programs. 
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4. The EAFR has addressed combinations of any or all of the following, (a) the 
DFDR function, (b) the CVR function, (c) a data link recording function, and 
(d) an image recording function in a single Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). In 
new airplanes, the EAFR records data provided by the digital bus in a single 
unit in the new ARINC 767 standards. 
Figure 4 has illustrated the data routes through the described acquisition and 
recording equipment. The Airplane Condition Monitoring System (ACMS) has 
incorporated all data (obligatory and nonobligatory) that have been monitored throughout 
the airplane and provided information to operators' programs. 
Some labels in the figure have not been explained because they are not viewed as 
essential to the comprehension of this study. Similarly, the diagram should not be viewed 
as applicable to the newer Boeing 777/787 and Airbus A350/A380, due to the integrated 
avionics technology used by these airplanes. 
Analog Inputs Discrete Inputs Mandatory ARINC 429 
Broadcast Bus Inputs 
Auxiliary ARINC 429 
Broadcast Bus Inputs 
Display 
(MCDU, MICDU, IDU) 
Figure 4. Interface Diagram (Adapted from Teledyne Controls, 2007). 
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The above simplified description provided has facilitated a basic understanding of 
the equipment. However, the hardware, the software, and the technology applied have 
varied according to the manufacturer and the production era. Table 1 has displayed an 
example of how different equipment has been used in different aircraft. 
Table 1 
Teledyne's Flight Data Monitoring Solutions Product Offering (Adaptedfrom Teledyne 
Controls, 2007) 
Data Acquisition Data Recording & 
Storage 
Aircraft 
Airbus A300 
Airbus A310 
Airbus A318 
Airbus A319 
Airbus A320 
Airbus A321 
Airbus A330 
Airbus A340 
Boeing B727 
Boeing B737Classic 
Boeing B737NG 
Boeing B747 
Boeing B757 
Boeing B767 
Boeing B777 
Boeing DC-10 
Boeing MD-11 
Boeing MD-80 
Fokker F-28 
Bombardier Challenger 
Bombardier Learjet 
CASA CN235 
Cessna Citation 
Cessna Citation III 
Cessna Citation Excel 
Dassault Falcon 50/900/2000 
De Havilland DHC-8 
Embraer 120 
Embraer 135/145 
Gulfstream G IV 
Gulfstream G V 
Gulfstream Galaxy 
Raytheon Beechjet 400A 
Raytheon Hawker 450 
Raytheon Hawker 800 
Raytheon Hawker 800XP 
Raytheon Hawker Horizon 
Raytheon Premier 1 
SAAB 340 
FDAU 
X 
X 
X 
X 
-
X 
X 
X 
DFDAU DMU 
X X 
X X 
-
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
X 
-
FDIU FDIMU 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
X X 
MFDAU 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
WQAR 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
QAR 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
ARINC Standards 
ARINC (Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated), previously mentioned in this study, is 
a company that was established by four major airlines in 1929 to attend the necessity of a 
single licensee and coordinator of radio communication outside of the government. 'The 
objective was to find a method of standardizing specifications, thereby resulting in the 
ARINC organization providing guidance in developing standards and protocols for 
avionics equipment" (Wu, 2005, pp. 15-16). Soon the company "took on responsibility 
for all ground-based, aeronautical radio stations and for ensuring station compliance with 
FRC rules and regulations" (ARINC, 2007, \ 3). 
As the technology of FDRs evolved, ARINC became responsible for the 
establishment of new standards for new equipment. Consequently, many ARINC 
specifications were created, leading to a potential confusion for nontechnical personnel. 
Wu (2005) stated that "ARINC standards have originated from project papers. For 
example, both the ARINC 429 and 717 standards began as project papers. Once 
approved, they have become known as ARINC protocols/specifications" (p. 16). Table 2 
has provided an overview of how standards changed with the development of flight 
recording systems. 
Table 2 
ARINC Standards for Flight Recording Systems (Adapted from Wu, 2005) 
Older Standards Newer Standards 
429 Recording System 717 Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit 
u 542A Digital Flight Data Recorder u 747 Flight Data Recorder 
§ 557 Cockpit Voice Recorder ^ 757 Cockpit Voice Recorder 
<
 573 Airborne Recording System < 757-1 Combined Voice/Data Recorder 
542 Oscillographic Recorder 767 Advanced Recording System 
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Metrics and Parameters 
To this point in the text, all the data recorded from aircraft have been generically 
referred to as parameters. For the purpose of this research, it was important to define the 
differences between what engineers have been calling parameters and what general 
industry, including regulators, have been calling parameters. Withers (2007) explained: 
An airplane parameter is a single value that can be measured on an airplane, such 
as nose gear up/down or the EGT of engine no. 2. A regulatory parameter is much 
broader, as in "autopilot mode.1' It requires dozens of airplane parameters to 
describe the "autopilot mode" for an airplane, (p. 20) 
Thus, engineers have been referring to parameters as each datum that can be 
provided by each sensor in the airplane. What industry personnel have been calling 
parameters, here termed metrics, has been the desired state of a system or a component in 
an airplane, such as the propulsion, the navigation, the autopilot, the communication, and 
the flight control system. To comprehend the system's condition in a selected time, 
several parameters (sensors' data) might be needed to record each desired metric. 
The number of parameters that has composed a metric varies from one (e.g., nose-
gear locked) to many (e.g., autopilot engaged). Thus, if a new metric has been requested 
by a regulator or airline, the manufacturer has needed to install one or many sensors and 
cables to measure the requested metric (Withers, 2007). It has not been a simple process 
to add new parameters to old airplanes, especially the ones without a DFDAU, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
This complexity has imposed challenges to regulators, manufacturers, and 
operators over time. Regulators were sporadically increasing the number of required 
parameters that should be recorded in FDRs, conflicting with the technical difficulties of 
installing and recording new parameters. After 1957, when the first regulation for an 
FDR was enacted, the FAA changed the requirements six times, as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Summary of the FAA New Airplane Regulations (Adapted from Withers, 2007) 
Rule Number of Parameters Category Comments 
1957 Rules 6 parameters 
1972 rules Part 121 343, 
1989 rules Para A and B 
1991 rules 17 parameters 
1997 rules 
1997 rules 
Part 121 343, para D 
17 parameter rule, 
All new turbine powered 
airliners 
Type certified after Sept 30, 
1969 plus the 747 
All new airplanes built after 
May 26,1989 
All new airplanes built after 
Oct 11,1991 
All new airplanes built after 
Aug 18, 2000 but before Aug 
19, 2002 
All new airplanes built after 
Aug 19, 2002 
NPRM Part 121 343, para D All new B737NG airplanes 
"2001 rules' 
Direct reading FDRs 
Illegal after May 26, 1995 
Retrofit to 11 parameters per 
121 343, para (L), 1991 rules 
Retrofit to 18 parameters per 
121 344, para (B)l, 1997 rules 
Early FDAUs 
Illegal after August 20, 2001 
retrofit to 22 parameters per 
121 344, para (B)2,1997 rules 
1st generation DFDAU 
Illegal after August 20, 2001 
retrofit to 22+ parameters per 
121 344, para (C), 1997 rules 
2nd generation DFDAU 
Illegal after August 20, 2001 
retrofit to 34 parameters per 
121 344, para (D), 1997 rules 
At least 128 WPS 
3rd generation DFDAU 
Solid state DFDR 
New 256 WPS standard 
3rd generation DFDAU 
Solid State DFDR 
Current production standard 
All B737NGS built on or after 
Aug 18, 2000 already comply 
Probably will not be 
implemented 
Although the equipment and standards have changed from the first foil FDR 
through SSFDRs, some old aircraft with old recording equipment have continued to be 
operated. Consequently, the FAA has maintained the standards for those models to match 
the previously discussed equipment limitations. Table 4 has depicted the evolution of the 
FAA7s required parameters to the current list of 88 parameters. The table has excluded 
the list that has been specific to the B737NGs. 
Table 4 
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The FAA Required Parameters from 
Build on/before 
October 11, 1991, no 
FDAU 
Retrofit 
Comply by 
August 18, 2001 
Build on/before 
October 11, 1991, 
with FDAU 
Retrofit 
Comply by 
August 18, 2001 
i Appendix M 
Build after 
October 11, 1991 
Retrofit and New 
Comply by 
August 18, 2001 
Build after 
August 18, 200 
New 
As delivered 
Build after 
August 19, 2002 
New 
As Delivered 
01 time 
02 pressure altitude 
03 indicated airspeed 
04 heading 
05 vertical 
acceleration 
06 pitch angle 
07 roll angle 
08 radio XMTR keying 
09 thrust 
(each engine) 
10 autopilot engage 
11 long acceleration 
12 pitch control inputs 
{column deflection) 
13 lateral cont Inputs 
(wheel deflection) 
14 rudder pedal input 
15 pitch control 
surface input 
16 lateral control 
surface angle 
17 yaw control surface 
angle 
18 lateral acceleration 
19 pitch trim 
20 TE flaps 
21 LE flaps 
22 thrust reverse 
(each engine) 
23 ground spoilers 
24 outside air temp 
25 AFC5 mode/status 
26 radio altitude 
27 localizer deviation 
28 ghdeslope 
deviation 
29 marker beacon 
30 master warning 
31 Air/Ground sensor 
32 angle of attack 
33 hyd pressure low 
34 ground speed 
35 ground prox warn 
36 landing gear posn 
37 drift angle 
38 wind 
speed/direction 
39 latitude/longitude 
40 stick shaker 
41 wmdshear 
42 throttle level posn 
43 other engine 
parameters 
44 TCAS warning 
45 DME1&2 distance 
46 NAVl&2freq 
58 thrust target 
59 CG trim fuel quan 
60 pri nav system ref 
61 icing alert 
62 eng warn 
vibration 
63 eng warn temp 
64 eng warn oil 
pressure 
65 eng warn 
over speed 
66 yaw trim position 
67 toll trim position 
68 brake pressure 
69 brake pedal posn 
47 selected baro press 70 yaw angle 
48 selected altitude 
49 selected speed 
50 selected Mach 
51 selected vertical 
speed 
52 selected heading 
53 selected fit Path 
54 selected decision ht 
55 EFISdisp format 
56 mult-funct engine 
and other alerts, 
format 
57 thrust commanded 
71 eng bleed valve 
72 de-icing select 
73 computed CG 
74 AC bus status 
75 CD bus status 
76 APU bleed valve 
77 hyd press 
(each sys) 
78 loss of cabin 
press 
79 computer failure 
80 heads up display 
81 para-visual 
display 
82 trim input-p i tch 
83 trim input - ro l l 
84 trim input -yaw 
85 flap control T E 
86 flap control L E 
87 speed brake 
handle 
88 fit control input 
forces (all axis) 
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The parameters listed in the table are those currently required by the FAA to be 
recorded in the DFDR, commonly referred to as the "black box," for accident 
investigation purposes. As recording systems have developed and started to be used for 
operational monitoring, a major number of parameters have become available to airlines 
that wish to monitor those via FOQA programs (Withers, 2007). Availability of the DAR 
has provided custom parameters in addition to those of the QAR, which has only been 
able to record those FAA-required parameters of the DFDR. 
Currently, some newer aircraft (including helicopters) in operation have provided 
1500 sensors as input for the DFDAU. This number has been forecast to increase to 2500 
in the new Boeing 787 (Withers, 2007). 
Data Acquisition and Recording 
The provided information concerning the acquisition and recording equipment, 
and the FDM programs, has introduced the general concepts of FOQA. The following 
section more accurately describes the processes and techniques that have been necessary 
for implementation and operations (I&O) of a FOQA program. 
Sensors 
As previously explained, flight data have been acquired from sensors that have 
been installed in a multitude of locations throughout the aircraft. These sensors have been 
sending signals that "reach the DFDAU via either analog (one signal per cable) or digital 
(multiplex) interfaces. Each signal cable enters the DFDAU via an input fcporf" (Withers, 
2007, p. 18). 
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Analog parameters have been sent to the DFDAU as either a continuous or a 
discrete function. The continuous functions have been able to assume many different 
values, while the discrete ones have produced only two states, 0 or 1 (e.g., open or 
closed) Vaz Fernandez (2002) reported that the software in the DFDAU "determines 
what parameters are captured, how many times per second they are recorded and how all 
the parameters are put together into a data frame" (p. 13). 
Transmitting and Recording Data via Data Frames 
Pnor to understanding how data have been recorded in DFDRs and QARs using 
the data frame concept, it has become important to comprehend how the digital data 
operate Due to the physical characteristics of electricity and magnetism, currently, any 
data m digital format have assumed only the format of 0 or 1 arranged in sequence. For 
example, for each character shown on the screen of the computer, there was a sequence 
of 0 and 1 that, "translated" to a readable format, represented that character Each state of 
0 or 1 has been called a bit. One bit, the simplest digital datum that can be recorded, has 
resulted in two possible states (0 or 1) Similarly, the arrangement of two bits has resulted 
in four possible states (00, 01, 10, or 11) Table 5 has shown the number of possible 
states, technically called resolution, for the correspondent number of bits. 
Table 5 
Bit Resolution (Adapted from Withers, 2007) 
No of Bits 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 32 
Resolution 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1,024 2,048 4,096 4,294,967,296 
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Technical standards to record data in DFDRs were suggested by the ARINC 717 
specification. It determined that the data were supposed to be stored in an established 
frequency and resolution (using a 12-bit word) in the data frame concept (Withers, 2007). 
In the earlier days of DFDR, the amount of flight data that could be stored was 
very limited; tapes and solid-state media could store only a few megabytes. This 
limitation imposed a requirement to optimize the use of the available space. Additionally, 
the strength of the data would not be lost in the optimization process. 
Each parameter in an aircraft has needed to be recorded at different frequencies. 
For example, date and month have been recorded each 64 seconds, while vertical 
acceleration (vertical G, or Nz) has been recorded 8 times per second, or 8 Hz. The 
available space would be misused if the date were recorded at the same frequency as the 
Nz (Withers, 2007). 
To improve the space utilization, the ARINC 717 established that the data would 
be recorded following the data frame concept. Withers (2007) explained that "a 'data 
frame' converts physical airplane data into coded digital data stream in the DFDR" (p. 
15). As shown in Figure 5, one data frame has been composed of four subframes, each 
one representing one second. Within each second, 256 words could be recorded in 
DFDRs, but as stated, the frequency rate at which each parameter has been recorded 
varies. For example, in each subframe Nz has occupied 8 of the 256 available spots (8 
words per second [wps], or 8 Hz). The other spots could be occupied by other parameters, 
as required. Figure 5 has illustrated that vertical G filled more than eight spots, meaning 
that it was recorded at a higher frequency (>8 wps/Hz). Conversely, the fuel flow of each 
engine has been recorded once per second (1 wps/Hz). 
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DATA FRAME 
1 
: 
Q 3 
O 
§ 12 
SUBFRAME 1 
1st second 
Sync Word 1 
Heading 
Pitch Alt 
Vertical G 
Vertical G 
Fuel Flow Engine 1 
SUBFRAME 2 
2nd second 
Sync Word 2 
Heading 
Roll Alt 
Vertical G 
Vertical G 
Fuel Flow Engine 2 
SUBFRAME 3 1 
3rd second | 
•^ • • • •^ •^H 
Sync Word 3 
Heading 
Pitch Art 
Vertical G 
Vertical G 
Fuel Flow Engine 3 
1 SUBFRAME 4 
| 4th second 
H^HH|HHH[HH 
Sync Word 4 
Heading 
Roll Alt 
Vertical G 
Vertical G 
Fuel Flow Engine 4 
Figure 5. ARINC 717 Data Frame Example Showing a Single Data Frame (Adapted from 
Vaz Fernandes, 2002). 
Each subframe has been identified and synchronized in the Ground Data Replay 
and Analysis Station (GDRAS) using a "sync" word that occupies the first spot of each 
subframe. Withers (2007) stated that "each DFDAU also marks each frame with a 
sequential 'frame counter" value" (p. 26). If the sync word were to be corrupted or 
misinterpreted by the GDRAS, part of the data could be distorted. 
A parameter can assume 4096 possible states when a 12-bit word has been used to 
record data, as recommended by ARINC standards. Figure 6 has displayed how to 
determine the resolution in which a parameter can be recorded. In this example, the oil 
temperature can assume values from 0 to 400 degrees Celsius. If one degree was 
established as resolution, only 400 out of the 4096 available possibilities would be used. 
Consequently, the resolution can be increased to a decimal of Celsius. To calculate the 
practicable resolution, the maximum achievable value has been divided by the number of 
possible states (here established as 4096). The example shows that the oil temperature 
could be recorded in steps of 0.097 degrees C. 
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, . recorded range 400 - . „ . . „ 
resolution - = = 0.0976 deg C 
number of possible states 4096 Figure 6. Calculation of Resolution for Parameters (Adapted from Withers, 2007). 
Other parameters cannot be fit to 4096 states. For example, altitude has been 
recorded with a 5-foot resolution, resulting in 12,000 states when the range varies from 0 
feet to 60,000 feet. To those parameters that have more than 4096 states, ARINC 
established that such parameters needed to be recorded in two different words and 'later 
manipulated through a concept called concatenation" (Wu, 2005, p. 23) in the GDRAS. 
For example, altitude has been recorded in two frames; one using as the resolution 1,000 
feet, and another using 100 feet. By using the concatenation method, the resolution was 
increased, as shown in Figure 7, complying with regulations. Data of both frames have 
been combined in GDRAS later to display the altitude of the airplane. 
resolution for 10,000 feet = — = 2.4414 feet 
4,096 J 
resolution for 100 feet = = 0.0244 feet 
4096 
Figure 7. Resolution for Altitude Utilizing Two Frames - An Example of Concatenation. 
Another possible solution to store parameters with a higher resolution would be to 
increase the number of recorded bits. As shown in Table 5, the augmentation of the 
resolution to 32 bits would result in more than 4 billion possible states. 
ARINC has established a new standard (ARINC 767) to address the needs of new 
flight data recorders. Recent airplanes have been using the digital bus concept - similar to 
an office Ethernet - bypassing the limitations of the old data frame concept. Withers 
(2007) elaborated as follows: 
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For the 787, a frame groups parameters that are recorded at the same rate. Thus, 
one 787 frame might contain data recorded twice a second, while another might 
hold the parameters recorded every five seconds. For each frame, the data frame 
defines the parameters to be recorded at that time interval, and the order in which 
the parameters will be sampled off [sic] the 787 digital bus. Each frame has a 
frame number, and each frame gets a time stamp when it is recorded and sent to 
the EAFR memory. The length of a parameter filed within the frame list is 
variable length to reflect the number of bits to store that parameter, (p. 82) 
In the 787, data have been expected to be available in a "server" inside the 
airplane to be downloaded by any device, such as an EAFR. Devices have not been 
expected to have direct access to parameters, but to access the required data from the 
server via Ethernet. 
Different Data Frames 
Although the data frame concept has been used in most airplanes with a FDAU or 
similar equipment, the data frame has been different for each airplane model, and 
sometimes for airplanes of the same fleet. Airplanes can have different specifications 
depending on (a) the year of production and (b) the operator's choice of monitoring 
sensors that were not the pre-established ones. To detect these different data frames, an 
airplane with a common DFDAU system has pin programming in the airplane 
side of the DFDAU connector that tells the airplane model, fleet, airplane number, 
and the correct data frame to output. The DFDAU reads this pin programming and 
configures itself to output the correct data frame. (Withers, 2007, p. 14) 
If (a) the wrong pin has been set, (b) the frame has been inadvertently changed, or 
(c) the DFDAU has output the wrong frame, the recorded data have been expected to be 
compromised or even unutilized. This has added to the complexity of adding new 
parameters. 
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Data Transfer 
After the data have been stored in the QAR or the DAR, they have been collected 
and analyzed by the FOQA personnel. Depending on the device utilized, data have been 
transferred by (a) ejecting the recording media from the QAR, (b) connecting a cable 
between a laptop and the QAR, or (c) transmitting them via wireless data link to the 
company's station while the aircraft has been on the ground. 
Whenever a detachable media has been used, its removal has usually required 
close coordination between the operator's maintenance control and the line maintenance 
departments. Most likely, maintenance has been removing the media during scheduled 
overnight maintenance, so that the removal process can be included as part of a regular 
work package or routine (FAA, 2004). 
The removal or download period must coincide with the recording memory 
capability of the media and meet the operator's needs for timely analysis of FOQA data. 
Specific procedures for data removal need to be supplied to the line maintenance 
personnel to permit proper data download. Data have been forwarded to GDRAS by 
ground transportation, electronic transmission or wireless transmission (FAA, 2004). 
By using wireless transmission, airlines have significantly reduced data delivery 
delays; the data have been typically available within 10-15 minutes after an aircraft has 
landed, versus several days or weeks with manual data retrieval (Teledyne Controls, 
2007). Another advantage of wireless has been the minimization of the necessary 
workforce to download data from airplanes. Figure 8 has depicted how data have been 
recorded and transmitted to the GDRAS using wireless communication. 
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Figure 8. Wireless GroundLink® System (Adapted from Teledyne, 2007). 
Data Analysis 
Once the data have been transferred to the GDRAS, they have been analyzed 
based on the objective and scope of the intended program. Several air carrier entities have 
been affected by and/or utilized the data analysis: Operational Safety, Aircraft 
Performance, Aircraft System Performance, Crew Performance, Company Procedures, 
Training Programs, Training Effectiveness, Aircraft Design, ATC System Operation, 
Airport Operational Issues and Meteorological Issues, among others (FAA, 2004). 
There have been three techniques to explore the FOQA data (FAA, 2004): 
1. In Exceedance Analysis, the FOQA personnel establish a 
. . . specific limit for the GDRAS to detect for a particular 
parameter. . . . This data can be trended over multiple flights to 
determine the number of exceedances occurring per flight segment. In 
addition, the data can be trended to determine which phase of flight, 
airport, or runway, if appropriate, depending on the event type. Levels 
of exceedance can be programmed for particular events based on the 
operator's risk assessment to assist in focusing resources on 
implementing corrective action on the highest perceived operational 
risk area. (p. 9) 
Corrections to operations manual, training programs, and risk assessment 
processes have been trended via the results of the analyzed data. 
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2. Statistical Analysis has been used 
. . . to create profiles of flight, maintenance, or engineering operational 
procedures. The profiles can use several measurements to build 
distributions of various criteria. A distribution of data will show all 
flights and enable a carrier to determine risk based on mean and 
standard deviations from the mean. (p. 10) 
Although exceedances might not be occurring, by using this method the 
airline personnel have collaborated on improvements of procedures and 
policies, not only inside the airline, but also in the system. 
3. In Validated Trend Information, data have been reviewed 
. . . to determine the nature of any required action. Such action might 
include the immediate notification of maintenance personnel if limits 
were exceeded that require inspection of the aircraft, reviews of the 
event to identify possible corrective measures, or a determination that 
further information is needed through crew feedback, (p. 10) 
By using this method, maintenance personnel have detected exceedances that 
were not perceived or logged by pilots and made the necessary repairs. 
To perform these analyses, there has been the need to acquire dedicated software 
"which searches through specific parameters in the flight data and checks if the limits 
have been exceeded" (Vaz Fernandes, 2002, p. 21) depending on the nature of 
information that the company desires. The software has been converting the digital data 
to decimal number (e.g., 101000001 can be converted to the number 341). Vaz Fernandes 
(2002) stated: 
To perform this conversion, it is necessary to know where each data frame begins 
in the recording . . how many words each subframe contain, what parameters are 
recorded, what their sampling rate is, and what conversion of equations were used 
in recording the parameters, (pp. 19-20) 
There have been a considerable number of corporations offering GDRAS 
software (Table 7). Figure 9 has depicted a mosaic of screenshots of the FOQA analysis 
software. 
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Figure 9. Screenshots of FOQA Analysis Software (Adapted from Teledyne and CEFA 
Aviation). 
Vaz Fernandes (2002) reported that following the analysis, "any events which 
have been identified by the software are highlighted and stored for further analysis. The 
remaining data can be archived if the airlines need it [sic] or else it is simply deleted from 
the QAR recording medium" (p. 23). 
After events have been detected, they need to be checked by a specialist, the FDM 
analyst, who can confirm if the event can be considered (a) valid, (b) caused by 
circumstance of that specific flight, or (c) caused by bad data. Vaz Fernandes (2002) 
stated: 
Any events which have been detected and validated by the FDM analyst are 
stored in a database. If the event is serious, data from the analysis may be used to 
support an internal investigation, possibly in conjunction with an air safety report 
(ASR). (p. 24) 
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Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) 
The FDM program and its relevant equipment were introduced in the last section. 
FDM programs have been recently named FOQA programs in numerous countries. The 
program has comprised efforts to identify deviations from standards in regular flights 
through the analysis of the data recorded by the ACMS. The FOQA objective has been to 
detect and correct potential problems before they lead to accidents (Kolczynski, 2006). 
Vaz Fernandes (2002) stated that the FOQA program 
. . involves regularly analysis of flight data from every sector flown by every 
aircraft, discovering and examining any irregularities in the operations and 
keeping track of underling trends in operational procedures and potentially 
dangerous events. If necessary, feedback on significant issues is provided, 
typically to the flight training department and sometimes to individual flight crew 
members, (p. 5) 
Safety has been improved by the training and the change of procedures that the 
company implements after an exceedance or any other desired event has been detected. 
The relevant aspects of FOQA have been detailed in this section. 
Background 
FOQA programs have been successfully used for many years by foreign air 
carriers (Kolczynski, 2006). British Airways started using the data provided by FDRs 
more than 40 years ago. For the last 30 years, their pilots have taken for granted that their 
operations have been recorded and analyzed by a program that has, as its objective, the 
identification of exceedances (Holtom, 2006). 
In the late 1960s Trans World Airways began monitoring certain parameters 
relating to approaches and landings as their FDRs were removed from the aircraft 
for periodical maintenance and All Nippon Airways started a flight data analysis 
program in 1974. At least eight airlines have had voluntary FDM-type programs 
in operation for more than 25 years and most of them recognize the important 
safety benefits they have provided to the operation. (Vaz Fernandes, 2002, .p 5) 
39 
In the US, FOQA "evolved from the use of flight data recorders (FDRs) which the 
United States Civil Aeronautics Administration made mandatory equipment in 1958" 
(Vaz Fernandes, 2002, p. 5). Currently, all major U.S. Airlines have implemented the 
FOQA Program (Kolczynski, 2006). 
Historically, FOQA programs have been voluntary in most countries. However, 
recognizing the important improvements that FOQA can provide for safety, ICAO and 
other national civilian aviation administrations around the world have highly 
recommended that airlines implement the program. Although its implementation has 
apparently required only the installation of equipment, other issues, such as data 
protection, have been interfering with the wide adoption of FOQA. 
Regulatoiy Agencies and Organizations 
In the earlier years of aviation, the U.S. government had almost no participation in 
the promotion or the regulation of aviation safety. Because aviation has become an 
important mode of transport, the necessity of regulations has arisen in the industry to (a) 
increase safety, (b) encourage development, and (c) protect economic interests (Kane, 
2003). Some of the current U.S. regulators and organizations that have direct influence in 
this research have been listed below. 
1. The United States Department of Transportation (DOT) was established by 
the U.S. Congress in 1966. The DOT's mission has been 
. . to develop and coordinate policies that will provide efficient and 
economical national transportation system, with the regard for need, 
the environment, and the national defense . . with the responsibility of 
shaping and administering policies and programs to project and 
enhance the safety, adequacy, and efficiency of the [U.S.J 
transportation system and services. (Kane, 2003, p. 144) 
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2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is a U.S. government agency that 
belongs to the DOT. The FAA was established in 1958 and has as primary 
responsibility the safety of civil aviation. The agency has been responsible for 
(a) safety regulations, (b) airspace and air traffic management, (c) air 
navigation facilities, (d) civil aviation abroad, (e) commercial space 
transportation, (f) research, engineering, and development, and (g) other 
programs (Wells & Rodrigues, 2003). 
3. The MITRE Corporation "is a not-for-profit organization chartered to work in 
the public interest" (MITRE, n.d., ^ 2) managing three Federally Funded 
Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) "in partnership with the 
government applying systems engineering and advanced technology to 
address issues of critical national importance" (MITRE, |^ 1). 
4. The Center of Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD) is one of 
the FAAs FFRDCs, in the MITRE Corporation, "dedicated to improving 
aviation system safety, security, and performance" (CAASD, n.d., ]j 2) in the 
US and around the world. Some of the CAASD projects are: (a) Advanced 
Automated Systems for Air Traffic Controller Training, (b) AviationSimNet" 
Simplifies Testing of New Aviation Concepts, (c) CAASD's Storm Chasers, 
(d) Controller Pilot Data Link Communications, (e) Grand Canyon Airspace, 
(f) Performance-Based Air Traffic Management (ATM) Operations for 
Improving Safety, Capacity, and Productivity, (g) Performance-based 
Navigation Standards for the National Airspace System, (h) Terminal Area 
Route Generation, Evaluation and Traffic Simulation, (i) Traffic Alert and 
Collision Avoidance System, and (j) Traffic Flow Management and the 
National Airspace System (CAASD). 
5. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) "is an independent agency 
that determines the 'probable cause' of transportation accidents and promotes 
transportation safety through the recommendation process" (Kane, 2003, p. 
245). The NTSB also evaluates the efficiency of safety programs that belong 
to other agencies, such as the FAA. The NTSB has been one of those 
responsible for the increase in the standards of the FDR during its history 
(Withers, 2007). 
Some of the current international regulators and organizations that have direct 
influence on FOQA and this research have been the following: 
1. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is the most important 
organization dealing with civil aviation and has as its principal activity the 
international standardization of civil aviation (Kane, 2003). ICAO is not a 
regulator, but it has as a major responsibility the creation and modernization 
of the standards and recommended practices that have been followed by the 
current 190 contracting states ("Making an ICAO standard," n.d.). 
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2. The International Air Transport Association (I AT A) "is an international trade 
body that represents over 240 airlines comprising 94% of scheduled 
international air traffic" (IATA, 2007,1 1). It has as its mission to represent, 
lead, and serve the airline, having safety as its number one priority (IATA). 
3. The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) is an intergovernmental 
organization of the European Union that has as its objective "to promote the 
continued development of a safe, efficient and sustainable European air 
transport system" (ECAC, n.d., ^ 2). 
4. The Join Aviation Authorities (JAA) is an 
. . associated body of the . . . ECAC representing the civil aviation 
regulatory authorities of a number of European States who have agreed 
to co-operate in developing and implementing common safety 
regulatory standards and procedures. . intended to provide high and 
consistent standards of safety and a 'level playing field' for 
competition in Europe. (The European Joint Aviation Authority, 2007, 
ID 
5. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) "is the centerpiece of the 
European Union's strategy for aviation safety" and has as its mission "to 
promote the highest common standards of safety and environmental protection 
in civil aviation" (EASA, 2007, ^  1). 
6. The European Organization of Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) is an 
organization in which the airlines and the industry meet to discuss technical 
problems. The documents and specifications written by EUROCAE serve as 
basis for some European regulations (EUROCAE, n.d.). 
The foregoing list has illustrated some of the agencies and organizations that have 
had direct influence on FOQA programs around the world. Some of the listed institutes 
have not been imposing standards but suggesting standards to guide the development of 
safety equipment and techniques. 
Regulation Issues 
For many years the main discussion about FOQA was the potential use of data for 
enforcement purposes, such as civil lawsuits that could establish liability against pilots 
and carriers. The fear that the data would be available to the media, the litigants, and the 
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public under the Freedom of Information Act has driven air carriers to be wary of the 
FOQA implementation (Kolczynski, 2006). 
The FAA established the following rules about FOQA data disclosure after the 
union of efforts by the FAA, the associations, and the airlines (FAA, 2004; Kolczynski, 
2006): 
1. Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 13 - Flight Operational 
Quality Assurance Program; Final Rule - Part 13.401: "Flight Operational 
Quality Assurance Program: Prohibition Against Use of Data for Enforcement 
Purposes". 
2. 14 CFR Part 193 - Protection of Voluntarily Submitted Information. 
3. FAA Order 8000.81 - Protection of FOQA data from public disclosure. 
The federal law that protected the voluntarily submitted information was enacted 
in 1996. As a response, the related U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations became effective in 
2001 (FAA, 2004). The FAA rule promised no enforcement, except for criminal or 
"deliberate" acts. Note that the FAA did not include the exception enforcements to 
intentional misconduct, willful misconduct, or reckless misconduct (Kolczynski, 2006). 
As a result of these efforts, FOQA has been implemented by U.S air carriers with 
the data protection and the de-identification of records, which has shielded data from 
other purposes and strengthened safety. Some countries have been establishing laws for 
data protection, while others have preferred to treat FOQA data as ordinary data, thereby 
hindering the implementation of a FOQA program. 
FOQA and Other Voluntary Safety Programs 
The ASRS has been acknowledged as the grandfather of VSPs. Most U.S. air 
carriers with an approved FOQA program have also voluntarily established other related 
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VSPs (FAA, 2004). A list of these proactive safety initiatives, developed and 
implemented by the airline safety departments, has evolved as the: 
1. Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP). 
2. Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP). 
3. Internal Evaluation Program (IEP). 
4. Flight Operation Quality Assurance (FOQA). 
5. Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). 
6. Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA). 
The AQP has been a 
voluntary alternative to the traditional regulatory requirements under CFR 14, 
Parts 121 and 135 for pilot training and checking. Under the AQP the FAA is 
authorized to approve significant departures from traditional requirements, subject 
to justification of an equivalent or better level of safety. (FAA, 2005, Tf 1) 
In airlines authorized to use AQP, pilots have been required to demonstrate 
proficiency in situations that simultaneously involve technical skills and crew resource 
management. The AQP training intervals for pilots have been increased via enhanced 
company instruction standards and refined curricular content based on quality control of 
the data. 
ASAP has matured with a goal "to enhance aviation safety through the prevention 
of accidents and incidents. Its focus has been to encourage voluntary reporting of safety 
issues and events that come to the attention of employees of certain certificate holders" 
(FAA, 2005, K 1). Employees have been encouraged to report safety issues, including the 
ones that may involve rules violation, under the incentive of anonymity and non-punitive 
actions. Each case has been individually studied by a team that evaluates the necessity of 
44 
further corrective procedures. The program has become an excellent source for daily 
human error data. 
The IEP "is a high level voluntary program that provides the certificate holder 
with a means to maintain and refine the management system by continually monitoring 
the effectiveness and efficiency of processes and systems" (FAA, 2006a, p. 5). 
Companies that have been using IEP maintain a higher level of rules compliance, safety, 
and management by monitoring their own procedures. An effective IEP has been 
designed to include (a) systems-oriented processes, (b) operational standards beyond 
regulatory compliances, (c) independent processes that organizationally have straight-line 
reporting responsibility to senior management, and (d) defined responsibility and 
authority. 
VDRP has had an objective of encouraging companies to report safety issues, 
including rule violations, to the FAA and to correct them. If the company reports the 
problem, the FAA has reviewed the facts and decided if the issue was due to carelessness 
or recklessness. The FAA may have decided not to penalize the airline, but, in exchange, 
it would monitor the company to ascertain if it has satisfactorily fixed the problem and 
taken the necessary actions to prevent other occurrences (FAA, 2006d). 
LOSA has developed as "a formal process that requires expert and highly trained 
observers to ride the jumpseat during regularly scheduled flights in order to collect 
safety-related data on environmental conditions, operational complexity, and flight crew 
performance" (FAA, 2006c, p. 2). LOSA has been providing unique data about the 
airlines' defenses and vulnerabilities because the data collected can impact almost every 
department in the airline; thus it has been important that representatives of all involved 
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departments actively participate in LOSA to facilitate the data collection and the 
implementation of the suggestions made by the LOSA team. 
Every VSP has distinct focused in one operational area. VSPs have cooperated to 
the increase the level of safety as they have guided the company in taking proactive 
safety actions based on small daily occurrences. If only one VSP has been implemented 
by a company, it can considerably enhance that company's global safety. If more VSPs 
have been implemented in the same organization, they can provide a superior level of 
safety, assuming that all of the VSPs have been adequately operated, including the 
integration of the information provided. FOQA data have been complemented by data 
from other programs as shown in Figure 10. 
Airplane's 
perspective 
Figure 10. Interaction of Voluntary Safety Programs. 
An operational issue (e.g., a frequent excess of energy during the approach to a 
specific airport) has produced reports in most of the items included in Figure 10 (FOQA, 
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LOSA, ASAP, and other sources). Other VSPs (e.g., AQP, IEP) have also had their data 
interacting with the data of the VSPs indicated in Figure 10. 
Data Sharing 
In the U.S., some VSPs have had data sharing as their principal premise. This has 
been noted in the FAA (2004) definition of FOQA; 
FOQA is a voluntary safety program that is designed to make commercial 
aviation safer by allowing commercial airlines and pilots to share de-identified 
aggregate information with the FAA so that the FAA can monitor national trends 
in aircraft operations and target its resources to address operational risk issues. 
(p. 1) 
One of the advantages of sharing data has been to permit stakeholders "to analyze 
aggregate industry safety data, identify problem areas, develop and implement 
appropriate corrective action plans, measure the effectiveness of those actions, and share 
the conclusions among stakeholders" (McVenes & Chidester, 2005, p. 10). The FAA 
noted that if the data provided by VSPs were shared, the level of the global aviation 
safety would be increased. The FAA established that operators of approved FOQA 
programs should "provide the FAA with aggregate FOQA data in a form and manner 
acceptable to the Administrator" (FAA, 2004, p. 19). 
However, sharing data has involved two primary problems: (a) the deliberate use 
of identified data, and (b) the development of technology. The first issue was solved by 
the FAA when it established the data protection rules, but one question still remained 
unsolved: How to share the data? 
To develop the appropriate methodology, the FAA, in 2004, established an 
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) that determined that FOQA and ASAP data, 
voluntarily provided by airline partners, would be shared within a Distributed National 
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Archive (DNA). The instrument developed by the ARC to share data was called 
Voluntary Aviation Safety Information-Sharing Process (VASIP). 
The Voluntary Aviation Safety Information-Sharing Process (VASIP) is designed 
to provide a means for the commercial aviation industry and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) to collect, share safety-related information, and to use that 
information to proactively identify, analyze, and correct safety issues that affect 
commercial aviation. (Chidester, 2007, p. 1) 
The VASIP Executive Steering Committee (ESC), composed of representatives of 
airlines, unions, the FAA, and the FOQA and ASAP ARCs requested NASA to be 
responsible for the development of both the Distributed National FOQA Archive (DNFA) 
and the Distributed National ASAP Archive (DNAA). NASA also had the cooperation of 
the University of Texas at Austin's Human Factor Research Project on ASAP (McVenes 
& Chidester, 2005). 
NASA, the University of Texas, and Battelle and its subcontractors have 
produced the requested system and activated its functions. De-identified data have 
been collected since January 2006, yielding over 200,000 flights of FOQA data 
and 4,500 events reported to ASAP. (Chidester, 2007, p. 9) 
Technically, NASA implemented servers in airlines' sites that could statistically 
answer queries, via T-l networks, from ESC requests. De-identified data have been 
pushed from each local FOQA-analysis machine to each local airline's archive server. 
Whenever the ECS sent an approved-request, the central server queried the airline's 
server. The requested information was pulled to the central server in the form of query 
results, as shown in Figure 11 (Chidester, 2007). 
4S 
Air Carrier Air Carrier Air Carrier Air Carrier Air Carrier 
FOQA System FOQA System FOQA System FOQA System FOQA System 
Figure 11. Distributed National FOQA Archive - DNFA (Adapted from McVenes & 
Chidester, 2005). 
The above method allowed only de-identified, authorized data to be sent 
whenever the ECS posed a query. There has been a firewall between the airline's FOQA 
machine (GDRAS) and the airline's DNFA local server that has prevented any identified 
data from being inadvertently requested. There has also been less dependence on the 
storage capacity of the central server. Events, tracks, and flight snapshots have been 
searched among airline's local servers to guarantee that a global correction was applied 
whenever necessary (Chidester, 2007). Companies that participated in the DNFA and the 
DNAA have been listed in Table 6. 
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Table 6 
Status of DNFA & DNAA Participants (Adaptedfrom Chidester, 2007) 
Company Participation Status 
Alaska 
American 
Continental 
Delta 
Frontier 
JetBlue 
Southwest 
United 
UPS 
ExpressJet 
DNFA only 
DNAA only 
DNFA & DNAA 
DNFA only 
DNFA only 
DNFA only 
DNFA 
DNFA (DNAA '06) 
DNFA 
DNFA & DNAA 
Processing data 
Processing data 
Active - no DNFA data feed 
Processing data 
Processing data 
Processing data 
Processing data 
Processing data 
Processing data 
SAA completed, hardware on order 
NASA and the FAA agreed on a two-year demonstration project that could be 
continued by any selected organization. On May 9, 2006, a status report concluded that 
The system is operational, test queries have been conducted, and the system is 
ready for operational queries as directed by the VASIP ESC. . . DNFA data are 
now being processed into the archives at five airlines at a rate of approximately 
50,000 flights per month. The total number of flights in the distributed archives 
by the end of April was well over 200,000. (Chidester, 2007, p. 4) 
Chidester also reported that in January 2006, 
The ASAP and FOQA ARCs were replaced by the Voluntary Safety Information 
Sharing (VSIS) ARC, which was tasked to oversee distributed archive operation 
and expansion, data analysis and reporting using the archives, and advocacy of 
solutions to problems and issues discovered and understood through the data 
sharing process. (Chidester, 2007, p. 1) 
Currently, the program has been migrating to the MITRE Corporation as a 
component of the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system, 
designed to comprise multiple sources of safety information and databases. MITRE has 
been described as a reliable site to keep sensitive safety information because it has been 
designated as a FFRDC, independent of federal agencies. ASIAS has formed a close 
relationship with the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), a joint industry and 
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government entity committed to an "integrated data-driven strategy to reduce the 
commercial aviation fatality risk in the United States and promote new government and 
industry safety initiatives throughout the world" (CAST, n.d., ^ 2). 
The Current FOQA Model 
FOQA has proven itself to be an excellent program, enabling air carriers to (a) 
improve safety, (b) correct deviations from standards, (c) detect maintenance issues, and 
(d) provide economy of operations. Consequently FOQA has been mandated in major 
airlines in Europe, South/Central America and in some Asian countries. 
Vaz Fernandes (2002) noted that FOQA programs were assisting more than 130 
airlines around the world to manage their operations. FOQA has also been adopted by 
other aviation sectors, such as corporations, general aviation, and helicopter companies. 
This section has provided a summary of the current use of FOQA, such as its current 
application, strategy of utilization, parameters, manufacturers, implementation, and 
limitations. 
Multiple Applications of the FOQA Program 
Not only have airlines benefited from FOQA programs, but some smaller 
corporate jets have been monitored by the Corporate FOQA (C-FOQA) trial and its 
continuation, an adaptation of the original program. Small jets, which have a 10 or more 
seat capacity, have been obliged to be equipped with a DFDR. As these airplanes have 
been equipped with the data acquisition equipment, the FOQA adoption has required only 
the installation of a QAR or similar external recording device. Alternatively, the costs of 
51 
implementing C-FOQA have been prohibitive for jets not equipped with any type of data 
capture equipment. 
There have been two principal differences between C-FOQA and FOQA; 
(a) C-FOQA has required smaller equipment due to the size of some jets, and (b) the time 
interval between each download has been longer (e.g., months; Lacagnina, 2007). 
Lacagnina reported that "compared with the airlines, corporate aviation departments have 
relatively few airplanes and more widely mixed fleets; thus, the opportunity to identify 
trends is limited. The solution is to aggregate the data collected under the C-FOQA 
program" (p. 15). 
The general aviation sector has also been adopting FOQA. Lau (2007) stated that 
"FDM programs, when adapted to General Aviation, can give operators a competitive 
edge by increasing both safety and efficiency" (p. 2). Similar to the airlines, the General 
Aviation domains that have been taking advantage of FOQA (G-FOQA) are (a) 
maintenance, (b) operations, (c) safety, and (d) training. 
The major challenge in implementing G-FOQA has been equipment technology; 
to date "many hardware and software companies and service providers have developed 
individual components of the future General Aviation FDM system. However, there is a 
current need to combine these efforts to create standardized wplug-and-play' options for 
the aviation consumer" (Lau, 2007, p. 12). The necessary investments have also been a 
barrier to the wide adoption of G-FOQA because aircraft owners have been rejecting the 
idea of spending on new equipment. 
Helicopter operators have also been taking advantage of FOQA. Although 
HFOQA GDRAS has been continually evolving, due to its particular operational 
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techniques, "the incorporation of the FOQA concept. . into the helicopter industry has 
been demonstrated as both feasible and valuable for the improvement of aviation safety" 
(Teixeira, 2006, p. 67). 
Airline Strategies for FOQA 
Each company has defined the area(s) of emphasis for their program; candidates 
have been (a) safety, (b) regulatory compliance, or (c) the reduction of operating costs. 
Depending on the corporate culture, FOQA has also been used to either promote a safety 
culture or a punishment culture. 
Safety, Regulatoiy Compliance, or Operational Efficiency 
Some of the considerable contributions that FOQA has provided to safety have 
been delineated earlier in this text. However, the world has evolved to the capitalistic 
precept that the objective of any company has been to be profitable. By monitoring some 
parameters (e.g., engine fuel flow) airlines have observed whether their operational costs 
could be reduced by (a) changing procedures, (b) reducing maintenance, (c) improving 
training, and (d) verifying pilots' performance and adherence to Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs; El-Khoury, 2006). 
Although all parameters have been potentially contributing to safety, not all of 
them have contributed to the reduction of operational costs. By recording EGPWS alerts, 
for example, FOQA could help prevent Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) accidents, 
but would not provide economies to the company other than those that could be 
potentially related to the costs of an accident. Anecdotal evidence has indicated that some 
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airlines have opted to invest more in parameters that provide savings, while investing a 
lesser amount in those parameters that provide data exclusively for safety enhancement. 
Airlines have also opted to manage only the parameters that have been mandated 
by regulators. ICAO Annex 6, Part I recommended "routine collection and analysis of 
Flight Data Recording (FDR) data become a standard practice in airline safety programs 
worldwide" (ICAO, 2004, p. 4). In some countries (such as China, France, and the U.K.), 
FOQA has been mandated for air carriers (Vaz Fernandes, 2002). Although airlines must 
run the program in these countries, the air carriers can reduce their implementation costs 
by managing only the required parameters. 
Safety Culture 
Humans have been prone to impose responsibility and punish any errors. FOQA 
has been providing valuable data that can highlight potential human errors. The results of 
data analysis can have led some operators to punish their pilots when threats have been 
detected, creating what has been referred to as "Flying the FOQA." The resultant fear of 
retribution (and perhaps excessive focus on adherence to SOPs, which may not have been 
correctly written) has posed the problem of hindering pilot performance. 
However, to enhance safety results, the program "must be rooted in a supportive 
culture, providing climate for non-punitive performance-monitoring, measurable 
reporting from front line employees about hazards encountered, and feedback concerning 
the corrective actions taken by the organization" (McVenes & Chidester, 2005, p. 6). If 
the company has developed a safety culture in association with its FOQA program, the 
employees have made significant contributions to both the program and overall safety. 
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Monitored Parameters 
As previously stated, there were hardware limitations in the nascent years of the 
recording systems. The FDRs and the FDAU were limited to the number of physical 
connectors that they could accept. Such limitations were addressed and curtailed by the 
integrated avionics concept used in new airplanes. 
New Equipment 
In the avionics of new airplanes, such as the Airbus A380 and the Boeing 787, the 
number of parameters that can be recorded has increased to almost 5,000. For instance, 
there have been sensors installed for obscure parameters such as seat belt signs. However, 
it has not been feasible to record signals from all those sensors due to the limit of the 
memory storage (H. Wu, personal communication, February 8, 2008). 
The recording rate used in the Airbus A380, specifically, has been 1024 wps. 
However, it has been a challenge for the designers of the data frame (also known as the 
logical frame layout) to place each of the desired parameters given that some have been 
recorded at more than 1Hz, thus reducing the amount of memory space available. In other 
words, not all parameters available from sensors will necessarily fit in a 1024 wps frame 
(H. Wu, personal communication, February 8, 2008). 
The FAA (2004) reported that "the average amount of FOQA data collected from a 
single, digital aircraft is approximately 7.2 megabytes (MB) per day, resulting in 2.6 
gigabytes (GB) per year" (p. 16). If the recording capacity of each FOQA-equipped 
airplane in the fleet were enlarged, it would not be practical to record, download, analyze, 
and store the gigabytes of data provided daily by the fleets of a large company. Thus, the 
appropriate parameters have needed to be chosen with capacity limitations in mind. 
55 
Availability versus Usability 
The available recording capacity of most of the airplanes has not been fully 
utilized. For example, operators have typically opted to have their FOQA program 
monitoring only 40 parameters in an airplane with 500 sensors recording at 128 wps. 
There has typically been unused recorder capacity; the companies have been selecting the 
list of parameters to be recorded based upon some factor other than capacity. 
Manufacturers 
This section has provided a list of the major hardware and software suppliers of 
the FDM related equipment. Table 7 has compared the products of the manufacturers. 
Table 7 
Main FDM suppliers [Adapted from Vaz Fernandes (2002), and CAA (n.d.)] 
Hardware Software 
Company 
Aerobytes Ltd 
Airbus 
ALYZAIR 
ATS International 
Austin Digital 
Avionica 
BAE Systems 
British Airways 
Flight Data Services 
Flightscape 
IATA - Flight Data Analysis 
L-3 Communications 
Muirhead Avionics 
Penny & Giles Aerospace 
RUAG Aerospace Defence 
SAGEM 
SimAuthor 
Smiths Aerospace 
Stransim Aeronautics 
Corp 
Teledyne Controls 
Thales Avionics 
DAU 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
FDR 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
FDR download 
device 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
QAR 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Replay 
data 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Analyze 
data 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
-
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Event 
database 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Data 
visualization 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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The information provided within Table 7 was retrieved from the Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA, n.d.), adapted from Vaz Fernandes (2002), and crosschecked at each corporation's 
available Website. 
As depicted in Table 7, there have been many supplier options for those 
companies that wish to implement FOQA; as recommended by the FAA (2004): 
An increase in the number of air carriers implementing FOQA programs has led 
to an increasing number of vendors and products supporting FOQA programs. 
The approach taken by these vendors varies widely and the technological 
solutions offered should be carefully evaluated to assess their suitability to the air 
carrier's needs, (p. 13) 
Suggested Implementation 
FOQA implementation has consisted of three phases: Planning and Preparation 
(Phase I), Implementation and Operations (Phase II), and Continuing Operations (Phase 
III). Figure 12 illustrates the specific elements that have comprised each phase of FOQA 
implementation as suggested by the FAA (2004). 
12 months 18 months 24 months 
Phase I: Planning and Preparation 
• Establish a steering committee 
• Define goals and objectives 
• Identify stakeholders ^ 
• Select technology 
• Select personnel 
• Define safeguards 
• Define events 
• Negotiate pilot agreement 
Define FOQA Information 
Submission Plan 
Generate FOQA and 
l&O plans V. 
Phase II: Implementation & Operations 
• Implement and audit security mechanisms 
• Install equipment 
• Train personnel ^ 
• Involve stakeholders 
• Collect and process 
airborne data 
• Analyze and validate data 
• Develop and document 
FOQA system procedures 
• Develop Information 
Submittal Procedures 
• Define start-up criteria 
Phase III: Continuing Operations 
• Conduct periodic reviews 
• Track costs and benefits 
• Evaluate emerging technologies 
• Expand data usage 
• Market the FOQA program 
• Conduct periodic meetings with company 
stakeholding departments 
> ^ 
Figure 12. Suggested Schedule for Implementing FOQA (Adapted from FAA, 2004). 
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Phase I 
Phase I has been the foundation of a FOQA program. Primarily, a steering 
committee has needed to be established incorporating participants of different entities. 
The committee has been required to formalize the operator's intent to initiate a FOQA 
program, identify and include stakeholders, and develop the I&O Plan. "A typical 
steering committee might include a senior management member and representatives from 
flight operations, maintenance, safety, training, and the pilot association, if applicable" 
(FAA, 2004, p. 12). The steering committee, assisted by the stakeholders, has defined the 
goals, the objectives, the emphasis of the program, and the users' needs, which guide the 
analyses and the use of the collected data. 
Next, the adequate technology and suppliers have needed to be carefully chosen 
by the steering committee to fit the particularities of the equipment that comprise the 
airline fleet(s). FOQA has comprised at least three interdependent specialized systems: 
(a) the airborne data collection, (b) the ground data replay and analysis, and (c) the data 
management and analysis. Events to be monitored have also been defined according to 
the aircraft type. 
FAA (2004) stated that the personnel selection "depends on the program's scope, 
the size and organization of the air carrier, and the technology that will be implemented 
to record and analyze information" (FAA, 2004, p. 13). Usually, the program's personnel 
has consisted of a FOQA manager, one or more FOQA analysts, and a FOQA Monitoring 
Team (FMT) composed of experienced pilots, as illustrated in Figure 13. 
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FOQA Steering 
Committee 
r 
FOQA Monitoring 
Team 
4-
FOQA Program 
Manager * 
1 
Pilot Association 
Gatekeeper 
FOQAAnalyst 
light Operations^ Flight Safety I I Flight Training I I Flight Standards Maitenance Engineering 
Figure 13. FOQA's Organizational Structure (Adapted from FAA, 2004). 
Due to the importance of data protection, an essential step has been to define 
safeguards; "FOQA requires vigilant security and privacy protection for confidentiality of 
the data and to protect data against unauthorized disclosure, alteration, misuse, or 
destruction" (FAA, 2004, p. 14). Employees, especially pilots, have needed to be 
confident that data would not be misused, thereby guaranteeing that the program would 
provide the expected results. 
The last and most important step of Phase I has been to generate the FOQA I&O 
Plan, which describes the key aspects of the program. The I&O Plan has been required to 
be submitted for FAA approval. Once approved, the air carrier has received protection 
from the FAA civil enforcement actions. The FAA (2004) AC 120-82 Appendix A has 
provided an example I&O Plan. 
Phase II 
Phase II has been the most labor-intensive phase of a FOQA program. In this 
phase the tasks outlined in the I&O Plan (e.g., the equipment installation, first recordings, 
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and first analysis) have been performed. FAA (2004) stated that in Phase II "the security 
policies and procedures defined in Phase I should be implemented and thoroughly tested 
to see that they are effective. . . . A schedule should be established for installation of all 
equipment" (p. 14). Moreover, personnel should be trained to install, use, and maintain 
the hardware and software; end-users should be educated to correctly handle the final 
data. 
Data collection has been required to be developed and tested for accuracy, 
completeness, and resource requirements. "Stakeholder confidence in the FOQA program is 
directly proportional to the data's accuracy, reliability, and completeness" (FAA, 2004, p. 
16). Whenever outcomes have emerged, they should be disclosed to (and discussed with) 
stakeholders, so they can better assess the return on the investment. 
Phase II has usually concluded with the development and documentation of the 
FOQA program procedures. Written procedures have described how to (a) define, update, 
and delete user accounts; (b) manage libraries of reports and graphics created by users; 
and (c) control security and access permissions for users and groups. Whenever the 
previous tasks were completed, an official start date was established to define "when 
FOQA data will be used for formal analysis and trending. The FOQA manager and 
members of the FMT should periodically review the startup criteria to identify and 
correct problem areas, as well as certify criteria completion" (FAA, 2004, p. 17). 
Phase III 
The focus has been changed from implementation to optimization in Phase III; the 
data have been used to improve the program. It has been recommended that the program 
be constantly reviewed and expanded when necessary. 
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The last steps of Phase III have been (a) to communicate to stakeholders the 
benefits of the program, and (b) to constantly review if FOQA's costs and benefits have 
been still attractive to the company. The FAA (2004) has suggested that airlines "conduct 
periodic FOQA meetings (preferably every 30 days) to provide company stakeholders 
with updated trends, information, and evaluation of previously implemented corrective 
actions" (p. 19). 
Limitations of the Current Model 
The text has previously discussed several FOQA limitations, especially those of 
technology and the misuse of data. Holtom (2006) has enumerated four difficulties 
surrounding FOQA implementation: (a) motivation, (b) costs, (c) technical difficulties 
and standards, and (d) accessibility and potential for misuse. 
There has been "a lack of motivation in airlines stems from not understanding the 
overwhelming benefits of a FOQA programme compared with the costs" (Holtom, 2006, 
| 14). Implementation costs, shown in the next section, have been high; nevertheless, 
when compared to the operational benefits and financial gain that an airline can enjoy, 
costs have become acceptable. 
Although "many technical difficulties have been overcome during three decades 
of evolution" (Holtom, 2006, \ 22), the major limitation to implementing FOQA has 
possibly been the technology. The volume of data has increased significantly; hundreds 
of parameters have been recorded many times per second. At the end of the day, there has 
been a considerable volume of data recorded from each aircraft. The Boeing 777, for 
example, "continuously processes around 60,000 parameters and even recording 2,000 of 
them can produce 40 or 50 megabytes of compressed data per day for each aircraft" 
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(Holtom, f^ 22). With this amount multiplied by the number of monitored aircraft in a 
company, a very large volume of data has needed to be stored daily. 
The data frame concept has provided the opportunity of acquiring data from more 
sensors but, as previously discussed, distortion or alteration of the sync word can corrupt 
the data. This issue has been solved by new ARINC standards that have been expected to 
be used in the Boeing 787 (Withers, 2007). 
There have been two principal human factors that have contributed to a program 
with distorted results: (a) airlines' use of FOQA as a punishment tool and (b) pilots flying 
to record the desired data. Establishment and awareness of a just culture by the company 
and its pilots, combined with the correct implementation of the program (including the 
negotiation of employment policies) has diminished these problems (Holtom, 2006). 
FOQA and Stakeholders 
Pearce & Robinson (2007) defined stakeholders as "influential people who are 
vitally interested in the actions of the business" (p. G-6). Therefore, stakeholders of the 
air carriers have been not only their departments, stockholders, management, and 
employees, but also society and the passengers. 
A company must show responsibility toward both the financial return and the 
society (Pearce & Robinson, 2007). By preventing accidents, FOQA may not only save 
the company funds, but also save lives. The program has also helped the environment by 
reducing fuel consumption per several U.S. air carrier anecdotes. Financial implications 
and benefits to stakeholders have been addressed in the following paragraphs. 
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Cost Implications 
The primary goal of any company has been to be profitable; it has not been 
practical to have a 100% safe system that has afforded nothing but monetary losses. 
Companies have needed to manage and calculate risks, balancing costs with benefits 
(Pearce & Robinson, 2007). Costs of investments in aviation safety have always been a 
target for debate. It has become commonplace that there are those who believe that 
investment in safety is never enough, while others have believed and stated that safety 
expenses do not yield financial returns. 
The implementation of FOQA has required some investment to contract and train 
personnel, and to acquire equipment. In contrast, accidents have imposed hidden costs on 
air carriers not covered by insurance, such as (a) equipment rental, (b) the cost of 
investigation, (c) loss of productivity of injured personnel, (d) the cost of cleanup and 
restoration of order, (e) increased operating cost on remaining equipment, (f) fines and 
citations, (g) legal fees resulting from the accident, (h) increased insurance premiums, 
and (i) loss of business and damage to reputation (Wood, 2003). 
AMR, the parent company of American Airlines, set aside a USD 41 million 
provision related to the December 20 1995 accident of an American Airlines 
Boeing 757 in Columbia. This was to cover the carrier's liability that was not 
covered by third party insurers . The accident, which involved the complete 
loss of the aircraft and all on board during the approach to landing, cost the airline 
at least USD 75 million . . In another example, China Airlines has offered a 
total of more than USD 83 million in compensation for the victims of the 25 May 
2002 crash of one of their Boeing 747 aircraft. The aircraft was insured for USD 
20 million. (Vaz Fernandes, 2002, p. 52) 
These two examples have referenced the expenditure of quantifiable items only, 
such as material and payable resources. The question (Lauber & Kayten, 1988) has 
prevailed: How can one measure the value of the lives and all the consequences that 
deaths can impose on the victims' families? These consequences cannot be measured. 
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Therefore, if the investment in safety programs prevents a single accident, the 
implementation costs will be paid many times over, discussed as follows. 
FOQA Costs 
FOQA costs have been divided into two parts; the initial costs and the annual 
costs. In a study for Continental Express, Cobert and Harris (2000) found that the initial 
costs have been composed of (a) airborne equipment, installation, and spares; (b) the 
GDRAS; (c) the flight animation system; and (d) additional computers. The ongoing 
costs have been made up of (a) media, (b) warranty expenses, and (c) personnel. 
Costs of equipment purchase, such as different types of QARs, have depended on 
the airline's needs, as illustrated in Table 8, since the aircraft have different technologies. 
Annual costs of maintaining airborne equipment have consisted of (a) warranty and repair 
(10% of initial cost), (b) annual media replacement (20%), (c) media costs, (d) download 
process time, (e) the number of media retrievals per month (depending on routes and 
equipped airports), (f) media shipment costs (depending on the method used by the 
company to mail or send packages), and (g) communication (Cobert & Harris, 2000). 
Table 8 
Airborne Equipment Initial Acquisition Costs (Adapted from Cobert & Harris, 2000) 
Airborne Equipment Options Cost Estimates 
Optical Quick Access Recorder (OQAR) $ 15,000,000 
PCMCIA QAR $ 25,000 
DFDAU/QAR $ 45,000 
Hand-held Download Units $ 10,000 
Docking Station $ 5;000 
Cobert & Harris (2000) found that for GDRAS, the initial acquisition costs have 
included (a) software, (b) a server, (c) two workstations, (d) a printer, and (e) additional 
tools. Initial costs for flight animation have consisted of (a) software, (b) a high-end 
computer, and (c) additional tools. Annual costs for both GDRAS and flight animation 
have been calculated as a percentage of initial costs; (a) support or upgrades (10%), (b) 
hardware (10%), and (c) additional tools (15%). 
Human resources have been the most costly component of on-going costs, 
achieving the average of 92% of total recurring costs. The personnel requirements have 
varied depending on (a) the size of the FOQA program, (b) the number of aircraft types 
and aircraft supported, and (c) other duties and responsibilities (Cobert & Harris, 2000). 
Table 9 has summarized the FOQA total annual cost - the sum of recurring and 
nonrecurring costs - estimated by the FAA considering fleets of different sizes. The data 
were acquired from the GAO study of 1997, one of the few studies about FOQA costs. 
Table 9 
Estimated Total Annual Costs by Fleet Size (Adapted from GAO, 1997) 
Fleet size (no. aircraft) 
Equipment costs (USD) 
Personnel costs (USD) 
TOTAL 
15 
98,500 
385,000 
483,500 
50 
295,000 
500,000 
759,000 
100 
492,000 
775,000 
1,267,000 
C-FOQA Costs 
Lacagnina (2007) found that the total cost of the equipment required for 
participation in a C-FOQA program was about US$10,000 to $13,000. This amount 
included (a) a QAR with one-gigabyte storage capacity, (b) an installation kit consisting 
of a wiring hardness and supplemental type certificate (STC), and (c) a software program 
to convert QAR data to a suitable, downloadable format. The installation of the 
equipment has cost about $2,000. 
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Savings Provided by FOQA 
Vaz Fernandes (2002) stated that airlines can reduce costs by (a) increasing 
aircraft availability, (b) optimizing fuel consumption, (c) avoiding unnecessary engine 
maintenance, (d) delaying parts' consumption and replacement, (e) reducing insurance 
premiums, (f) reducing ACARS messages, (g) meeting noise-abatement procedures, (h) 
reducing FDR downloads, and (g) extending AQP single visit training (SVT). Table 10 
has provided an overview of the estimated annual savings that FOQA could provide to a 
specific company in 5 years. 
Table 10 
Total Annual Savings plus Total Savings per Flight Hour (Adaptedfrom Cobert & 
Harris, 2000) 
Item Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Reduced Engine Removals 
Engine On-Wmg Extension 
Detection of Out-of-Trim Conditions 
Fuel Savings 
Brake Wear Reduction 
Insurance Savings 
AQP SVT Training Savings 
Total Benefits 
125,000 
412,500 
3,141 
14,692 
6,000 
0 
0 
561,333 
500,000 
1,650,000 
12,563 
58,769 
24,000 
0 
0 
2,245,331 
500,000 
1,650,000 
12,563 
58,769 
24,000 
1,250 
162,667 
2,409,248 
500,000 
1,650,000 
12,563 
58,769 
24,000 
5,000 
162,667 
2,412,998 
500,000 
1,650,000 
12,563 
58,769 
24,000 
5,000 
162,667 
2,412,998 
If the total savings that FOQA can provide has been subtracted from the total cost 
of its implementation, it would be noted that the company can achieve a net gain per year, 
as shown in Figure 14. This result has not (and cannot) include savings that the program 
has provided through the avoidance of accidents. 
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Figure 14. Cost Benefit Analysis by Flight Hour (Adapted from Cobert & Harris, 2000). 
Benefits 
The principal advantage of FOQA has been to prevent potential accidents by 
detecting daily operational errors. Air carriers without FOQA have not had (a) a detailed 
knowledge on how their aircraft have been operated and (b) the capability to compare a 
specific flight with a fleet profile to analyze systemic aspects of flight operations (FAA, 
2004). 
Current Benefits 
Holtom (2006) highlighted some of the safety benefits provided by FOQA, 
including the detection of (a) non-compliances and divergences from SOPs, (b) 
inadequate SOPs and inadequate published procedures, (c) ineffective training and 
briefing, and (d) inadequate handling or command skills. 
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FOQA also has enabled air carriers to "feel the pulse" of the line operations by 
(a) analyzing a stream of information; and (b) positioning management to take decisions 
based on data, not on speculation, anecdotal events, or opinions. Managers have used 
FOQA data to increase earnings to the company that exceed the costs of implementation 
by (a) correcting inefficiencies, (b) operating in accordance with effective SOPs, (c) 
anticipating maintenance problems, and (d) re-training employees and crew as required 
(FAA, 2004). 
Additionally, El-Khoury (2006) stated: 
The cost-benefit study estimates that airlines will reduce their expenditures for 
fuel and maintenance as well as reduce the number of accidents and incidents 
over time, avoiding their associated costs. Because FOQA programs analyze 
additional data on aircraft systems and engine conditions, airlines are better able 
to achieve optimum fuel consumption and avoid unneeded engine maintenance. 
(p. 41) 
Possible Benefit: Interpretation of the Human Factor 
The interface between the human and the machine has been problematic. The 
belief has existed that if more technology is implemented the human workload will be 
reduced. New technology has been introduced because it has been thought that "it helps 
people to perform better [and] the replacement of human activity with machine activity 
has no larger consequence on the overall human ensemble" (Dekker & Woods, 2002, p. 
7). However, automation has required humans to have new skills, knowledge, training, 
and awareness to correctly interpret and interact with new devices. Table 11 has 
illustrated the apparent benefits of automation versus real effect on operational personnel. 
68 
Table 11 
Apparent Benefits of Automation versus Real Effects on Operational Personnel (Adapted 
from Dekker & Woods, 2002) 
Putative benefit Real complexity 
Better results, same 
system (substitution) 
Offloads work 
Focuses user attention 
on the right answer 
Less knowledge 
Autonomous machine 
Same feedback support 
Generic flexibility 
Reduces human errors 
Transforms practice, the roles of people 
Creates new kinds of cognitive work, often at the wrong time 
More threads to track; makes it harder for practitioners to remain aware of 
and integrate all of the activities and changes around them 
New knowledge and skill demands 
Team play with people is critical to success 
New levels and types of feedback are needed to support peoples' new roles 
Explosion of features, options and modes create new demands, type of 
errors, and paths towards failures 
Both machines and people are fallible; new problems associated with 
human-machine co-ordination breakdowns 
Two major problems have resulted from automation that can be potentially 
monitored and improved by FOQA (as detailed in Chapter 3): Availability and selection 
of the proper view mode, and the workload imposed on the crew. Amplification of these 
automation problems has been provided in the following paragraphs. 
Data availability and observability. 
There has been the belief that if 
. . . data can be shown to have been physically available to practitioners; it should 
have been obvious or picked up by them. . . . [However,] automated systems have 
made it really hard for practitioners to pick up subtle changes in mode or status. 
(Dekker & Woods, 2002, p. 12) 
Also, whenever systems have tended to be stronger - and consequently requiring 
less human input - they have also tended to remain silent about what, or how well, they 
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have been performing. As a result, an increment of coordination has been demanded from 
workers to comprehend what the system is silently executing (Salter, 1994 cited in 
Dekker & Woods, 2002). 
Even if the system has provided the necessary data, another issue has persisted, as 
explained by Dekker & Woods (2002); ''there is a large difference between data that can 
be shown to have been available in hindsight,. . . and data that was actually observed, 
used and integrated by the crew given their ongoing tasks and attention demands" (p. 13). 
In current airplanes' Multi-function Computer Display Units (MCDUs), several modes 
have existed that can be selected by the crew to monitor different systems in each phase 
of the flight. Although the information has been available, the crew may not have 
selected the appropriate mode to see and comprehend the necessary information, 
especially in highly dynamic situations (e.g., approaches). 
Automation and workload. 
Dekker & Woods (2002) also found that 
automation often does not help during busy periods. In fact, it gets in the way. 
When there is already a lot to do, automation will give the user even more to do. 
It will ask for inputs, it may spring surprises, (p. 15) 
In fact, reconfiguring an automated aircraft during a final approach, for example, can 
impose a tremendous workload to the crew. 
By monitoring certain systems in the aircraft, FOQA can help designers to 
understand if humans have been properly (a) configuring the aircraft, (b) selecting the 
correct mode on systems and MCDUs, or (c) being overloaded in their tasks (as further 
elaborated in Chapter 3). 
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Recapitulation 
The advantages that companies have obtained from a FOQA program have been 
numerous and the benefits have justified the costs; consequently, implementation of the 
program has been a valuable option. However, airlines have continued to compare the 
costs and benefits associated with safety; hence, the parameters to be monitored by 
FOQA cannot avoid the costs issue. For the purposes of this thesis, it was decided not to 
address the cost issue, but rather to explore an improved list of parameters/metrics. 
Research Questions 
The derivation and history of both flight recording and flight data monitoring 
(generally referred to as FOQA in the U.S.) has resulted in the use of historical sets of 
FOQA parameters for flight safety analysis. Discussion among FOQA experts concerning 
the use of these historically derived parameters resulted in several research questions that 
were to be answered by this thesis: 
1. What parameters (that potentially provide improvements to safety) have 
continued to be unmonitored by FOQA? 
2. Who has been making the decisions about the parameters to be monitored? 
3. Has the U.S. industry become amenable to the discussion and introduction of 
new parameter lists? 
The methods used to answer these questions have been detailed in Chapter III. 
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Chapter III 
METHODOLOGY 
Members of the thesis committee were aware that the industry was in need of an 
expanded list of aircraft parameters that should be monitored by FOQA programs. The 
thesis topic was thus defined; a mixed methods study commenced in August 2007 and 
was completed in June 2008. The following steps were deemed as necessary to complete 
the study: 
1. Formulation of a group of FOQA experts willing to discuss the topic via a 
conference call. 
2. Preparation of the conference call. 
3. Execution of the conference call. 
4. Compilation of a list of parameters from the expert discussion. 
5. Development of a research instrument as an outcome of the conference call. 
6. Pretesting of the instrument. 
7. Refinement of the instrument. 
8. E-mailing the instrument to a select group of U.S. FOQA experts. 
9. Analysis of the returned quantitative and qualitative data. 
10. Reporting of the study's results. 
Initial Queries 
As shown in Chapter II, FOQA evolved from the obligation of recording flight 
data in DFDRs to a routine program when some air carriers noticed the advantages of 
analyzing the data proactively for operational improvements. Since the 1960s, FOQA 
programs have evolved due to (a) the modernization of equipment and/or (b) rules and 
requirements. Consequently, a rudimentary number of parameters have historically been 
72 
available to be recorded by FOQA; these have been established by (a) the aircraft 
manufacturers, (b) the airlines, and/or (c) the regulatory agencies. Companies have 
chosen the parameters that best fit their needs from the offered list(s) or have had to work 
with what has been available. Regarding the lists of parameters available for FOQA 
programs, R. Lawrence (personal communication, November 29, 2007) commented that 
the FOQA specialists 
have been frustrated with the lack of coordination and planning in the area of 
recorded parameters, not only within airlines but also within the whole industry. 
Granted, the airlines need a certain degree of autonomy to pursue their parochial 
interests with regard to recorded data. But what we have now is complete 
anarchy. 
Considering this scenario, the first uncertainty arose from the thesis committee: 
"Who has been deciding which parameters the company will monitor"? The committee 
reasoned that airlines have not had other list options than the ones offered by the 
suppliers and manufacturers. That inference led to a second question, "Have the 
parameters been chosen because they could be potentially valuable to safety or because 
they were suggested by the suppliers"? The committee presumed that, if the answer to the 
second question was affirmative, there might be parameters of significance to safety that 
have not been monitored by FOQA; either because they have not been available on the 
bus, or because the parameters have been chosen for analysis by tradition. The principal 
query for this study was thus established: "What parameters are still not being monitored 
by FOQA that potentially provide improvements in safety"? 
As shown in Chapter II, the FAA (2004) emphasized the importance of the 
participation of all the airline's departments in the FOQA program; however, many 
departments and specialists (e.g., pilots) may not have had the opportunity of opining in 
the construction of the manufacturers' lists. The nonparticipation of experts from all 
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departments may result in the absence of important parameters among the current 
available ones. The contribution of all aviation specialists in the construction of a list 
would greatly contribute to safety, but "is industry available to discuss and introduce new 
parameter lists?" Once the research matter was established, the thesis committee 
scheduled its first meeting. 
The First Meeting 
On October 17, 2007, at 1:00 p.m., the researchers Giorge Tsuruta (graduate 
student), Thomas Weitzel (committee chairman), and Roger Mason (committee member) 
met in Daytona Beach, Florida to decide the initial steps for the thesis. Carl Halford 
(committee member) joined the meeting via a conference call. 
The meeting started with Halford's industry expertise refining the questions that 
were starting to drive the thesis. The thesis committee decided that the research needed 
the help of FOQA experts, who would collaborate with the thesis by (a) providing 
information, (b) providing ideas, and (c) cooperating with the selection of metrics that 
would be used in the research instrument. A brainstorming session resulted in the 
selection of several U.S. industry professionals; some were close contacts of the 
committee members. 
The following actions were set to follow the first meeting: 
1. Halford was in charge of (a) providing a list of approximately 15 parameters 
that have not been measured and recorded in airplanes, (b) researching 
parameters already feasible in current airplanes, and (c) researching which 
airlines have used which parameters. 
2. Tsuruta, Weitzel, and Mason were to choose a maximum of 10 parameters out 
of the 15 provided by Halford to support the research. Some of the parameters 
suggested in the meeting as candidates for making part of the list were (a) 
TCAS, (b) GPWS, (c) auto-throttle engagement, (d) wind-shear alerts, (e) 
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switch positions, (f) "bugs," (g) "altitude windows," (h) "altitude busts," and 
(i) unstable approaches. These parameters were merely initial suggestions that 
were not necessarily exploited. 
3. An attempt to explore the newest airplanes from Boeing, Airbus, and Embraer 
was established. Tsuruta was given the task of contacting Boeing's Alan 
Withers to request information about parameters that were already available 
on the data buses of Boeing aircraft. 
4. A FOQA-expert committee would be formed to judge if the selected 
parameters could be considered important to industry. The suggested names 
were: Carl Halford, Roger Mason, Han Wu, Bob Lawrence, Doug Diehl, and 
Ken Petschauer. These names were chosen by (a) the familiarity with the 
covered airplanes, (b) airlines contributing to the DNFA, and (c) the level of 
contact with the thesis committee members. Halford agreed to contact some of 
the suggested names to obtain approval for their participation. 
5. Tsuruta was to elaborate the plan that would guide the conference call and to 
be the facilitator of a debate about the selected parameters by the FOQA 
Committee. Weitzel was set to be the assistant during the debate. A mean of 
10 minutes of discussion for each parameter was suggested. 
6. After the FOQA-expert committee supported a number of parameters, Tsuruta 
was to design an instrument to be administered to selected airline personnel. 
The instrument was to check for an interest in the aforementioned parameters. 
This would be the last phase of data collection, resulting in a mixed methods 
study. 
After the steps were defined, the conference call ended with concurrence that all 
participating members would be accessible either by phone or e-mail. Following the first 
meeting, another conference call (with Tsuruta, Weitzel, Mason, and Han Wu as 
participants) provided Wu with the results of the initial meeting. Wu agreed to (a) 
participate in the research as a thesis committee member and (b) contribute to the project. 
It was agreed that (a) the problem has been of interest to the members of the FOQA 
community and (b) the industry could be attracted by the research results. 
Many of the actions set in the first meeting were followed, as described later in 
this chapter. However, some needed to be modified during the course of the research. 
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Mixed Methods 
Gay, Mills, & Airasian (2006) stated that "mixed methods research designs 
combine quantitative and qualitative approaches by essentially mixing both quantitative 
and qualitative data in a single study" (p. 490). Although the utilization of mixed methods 
has been increasing in the last decade, the method has still been considered new in the 
design of studies. Therefore, authors have encouraged researchers to provide a basic 
description of the used mixed methods. 
There have been a number of different classifications for mixed methods, though 
this research had as its base Creswell (2003), who classified them in six main categories: 
(a) sequential explanatory strategy, (b) sequential exploratory strategy, (c) sequential 
transformative strategy, (d) concurrent triangulation strategy, (e) concurrent nested 
strategy, and (f) concurrent transformative strategy. The approach used in this study has 
been associated with the concurrent triangulation strategy because: 
1. The instrument used to collect the data contained both qualitative and 
quantitative questions. 
2. A number of qualitative data were complemented by qualitative answers due 
to the lack of research on this topic. 
A concurrent triangulation model, according to Creswell (2003), 
. . . is probably the most familiar of the six major mixed methods models. It is 
selected as the model when a researcher uses two different methods in an attempt 
to confirm, cross-validate, or corroborate findings within a single study. . . . The 
quantitative and qualitative data collection is concurrent, happening in one phase 
of the research study. . . . In practical application the priority may be given to 
either the quantitative or the qualitative approach. This strategy usually integrates 
the results of the two methods during the interpretation phase, (p. 217) 
Mixed methods have usually imposed some challenges on the researcher, such as 
"the need for extensive data collection, the time-intensive nature of analyzing both text 
and numeric data, and the requirement for the researcher to be familiar with both 
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quantitative and qualitative forms of research" (Creswell, 2003, p. 10). These challengers 
and other characteristics of the concurrent triangulation mixed methods study may be 
observed in this chapter. 
Research Design 
Within the U.S., there had been no prior studies concerning FOQA parameters. 
Thus, the thesis committee determined that prior to commencing this study it would be 
appropriate to query within the industry as to the need for the ideal FOQA safety 
parameters. The method chosen to obtain the desired knowledge was a conference call 
that joined a number of FOQA experts that opined and freely discussed the matter. 
The conference call included representatives of several U.S. entities with data 
frame and FOQA expertise across the industry. The discussion provided high-quality 
data, which granted enough information not only for the instrument development, but 
also for the continuous development of the topic. 
After the instrument was developed, it was pre-tested on a number of master's 
degree students at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) who possessed some 
knowledge of FOQA. After adjustments were performed, a final instrument was sent to a 
select number of industry FOQA specialists. The e-mail addresses were obtained from 
the contacts of the thesis members and conference call participants. The instrument was 
designed to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. 
The Conference Call 
At 6:00 p.m. on November 29, 2007, a teleconference was convened using 
MITRE Corporation's MeetingPlace. The expert participants were, in alphabetical order: 
77 
1. Alan Withers (Engineer with The Boeing Company). 
2. Bob Lawrence (Associated with the DNFA and retired United Airlines Boeing 
777 Captain). 
3. Carl Halford (Technical Engineer with MITRE's ASIAS and SMS projects). 
4. Ken Petschauer (JetBlue Embraer El90 Lead Check Airman; former Airbus 
A320 and Boeing 757 First Officer). 
5. Roger Mason (American Airlines Boeing 767 Captain and ERAU Adjunct 
Professor). 
The conference coordinators were Giorge Tsuruta and Thomas Weitzel. The goal was to 
determine a list of parameters to be addressed by this research. With the permissions of 
all participants, the conference call was audio-taped by the author; thus, an accurate log 
of the discussion was created. 
The meeting started with Weitzel, Tsuruta, and Halford introducing the objective 
of the meeting to the expert participants. It also emphasized the importance of the 
research to the aviation industry. Although the initial plan was to thoroughly discuss a 
pre-established list of metrics (previously set by the thesis committee), the conference 
took a somewhat different course; participants discussed what would be a general review 
of the metrics presently available in FOQA programs today, and the changes necessary to 
obtain improved quality data for specific use in FOQA programs. The group additionally 
discussed new parameters that they judged to be important to add to the ideal list of 
FOQA parameters. 
A timeframe of 20 years into the future was established to facilitate the 
discussion. It was also established that although costs have been highly important in the 
real world, the list of metrics should not be hampered by budget limitations. Another 
conclusion quickly reached was that, for practical purposes, older airplanes that do not 
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possess DFDAUs would not be considered in the discussion due to the complexity of 
installing new sensors in these airplanes. A. Withers (personal communication, 
November 29, 2007) rationalized during the conference: 
Adding parameters can be hard or easy depending on either if they are available 
or not. . Adding an analog parameter means sensors and wiring. . . . But if you 
add a digital parameter, a lot of times the parameters you want might already be 
there on the bus but just not being looking for right now. 
The expert discussion of the issues continued for 2 hours. A list of the suggested issues 
and metrics has been created. 
The present lack of standardization in the design of data frames was also 
discussed. Dozens of data frames have existed for different airplanes and different 
airlines. Withers and Lawrence also mentioned how data frames can be changed by 
maintenance without consulting the other data users, such as the FOQA programs, to 
adapt it to company needs. As explained in Chapter II, incorrect manipulation of the data 
frame has compromised the entire recording. 
After the conference, Lawrence e-mailed a generic list of parameters available to 
FOQA software vendors and airlines; this list was used by the DNFA. Additionally, 
Withers proposed that after a final parameter list was set, he could review the list to 
cross-check with parameters available in the B737NGs, as well as other available lists to 
check the availability of such parameters on the various data buses on Boeing aircraft. 
The teleconference ended with agreement among all participants that the project 
was important to the industry and should be considered for purposes beyond this thesis. 
All participants agreed to continue participation in the research. It was planned that the 
final list of parameters was going to be refined by Halford, Weitzel, Mason, and Tsuruta 
with the assistance of all participants. 
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Sampling the Industry 
Many of the FOQA professionals have not had the appropriate opportunity to 
identify and select the desired safety parameters to be monitored by their FOQA 
programs. In choosing these professionals, the researchers' intent was (a) to acquire 
valuable data with the personnel that have been dealing daily with FOQA, and (b) to 
provide these specialists the opportunity of opining on a potential list of new, ideal 
parameters. Although they have often not been the final decision-makers on which 
parameters to record, they have been the experts that interpret the data derived from the 
parameters, thereby possessing the knowledge to opine about the parameters. 
The researchers did not have access to the total number of FOQA professionals in 
the U.S., but a maximum number for the sample was sought due to the limitations of 
obtaining such contacts; as stated earlier, the industry was sampled via the individuals 
provided by members of both the thesis committee and expert participants. They joined 
names of FOQA professionals with their respective e-mails addresses in an Excel sheet. 
A total list of 42 e-mail addresses was assembled. 
The Instrument 
Two restrictive characteristics determined the type of instrument to be used and 
how the recipient would be questioned: (a) the location of the FOQA professionals, and 
(b) the time available for each to participate in the research. Due to these restrictions, the 
committee concluded that the optimal approach would be an electronic questionnaire 
distributed via e-mail. 
Although web-based survey programs have been commonly used, the researcher 
opted for an Adobe Acrobat PDF file. This decision was based on (a) the ubiquitous 
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Adobe Acrobat Reader and (b) the possibility of companies' firewalls blocking survey 
Websites. The PDF file would be attached to the introductory e-mail (Appendix A). The 
survey contained a button that would transmit the answers using either the respondent's 
Microsoft Outlook or other type of e-mail service. 
The Pilot Test 
A pilot test of the instrument evaluated (a) its quality, (b) its feasibility, (d) its 
readability, (e) the level(s) of difficulty in answering the items, (f) possible technical 
failures, (g) overall format, and (h) possible improvements. The pretest was sent to eight 
candidates in ERAU's Master of Science in Aeronautics (MSA) program who possessed 
some knowledge of FOQA programs. 
The students were asked to answer the survey, based on their knowledge, and 
send it back to the researcher with comments and suggestions for improvements. After 
the instrument was adjusted, it was reviewed a number of times by the thesis committee. 
After the final satisfactory quality was achieved, the instrument was sent to the 42 FOQA 
experts. 
The Instrument's Items 
The items contained in the final questionnaire (Appendix B) had as their base of 
construction (a) the research questions, (b) the parameters suggested by the experts in the 
conference call, and (c) the refinements made by the thesis committee. Some qualitative 
questions were chosen to (a) collect as much data as possible from the interviewees and 
(b) to facilitate the analysis. Moreover, the quantitative questions were complemented by 
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qualitative inquiries, as suggested by mixed methods, due to (a) the low number of 
sample participants and (b) the lack of previous studies of the topic. 
The introduction for the questionnaire was the body of the e-mail sent to the 
sample. The instrument included a heading with the University name, logo, and course 
name, as authorized by the MSA Program Coordinator. Brief directions on how to 
complete the survey preceded the questions. The questions were separated into four 
groups: (a) confidence level of the need for the improved, ideal FOQA parameter(s), (b) 
participant demographics, (c) multiple choice items, and (d) general comments. 
Confidence Level Section 
In this section, the respondents were initially required to appropriately check the 
box and quantify in a scale how important each parameter would be for daily safety 
FOQA analysis. A scale of six points (0 to 5) was used as followed: 
0 = Does not Need to be Included 
1 = 20 pts of Need to be Included 
2 = 40 pts of Need to be Included 
3 = 60 pts of Need to be Included 
4 = 80 pts of Need to be Included 
5 = Does Need to be Included 
The respondents were also invited to fill in comments for each parameter. As 
already stated, the list of parameters evaluated was obtained as a result of the conference 
call. Although a number of parameters that comprise the list have been available on some 
airplane buses (and monitored by some companies), they have not been common to 
FOQA programs. Therefore, these parameters, judged to be important in the daily FOQA 
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analysis by the experts, were included in the final list. Table 12 shows the parameter list 
evaluated in this section. 
Table 12 
Confidence Level Questions 
Category Parameters 
Automated Flight 01. Pilot-typed inputs to the Flight Management Computer (FMC) via the 
(Multifunction) Control Display Unit ([M]CDU). 
02. Pilot selections of automated flight. 
03. The Flight Mode Annunciation (FMA). 
04. The page(s) displayed on the (M)CDU(s). 
05. ILS Autoland Annunciations. 
Warnings 06. All Traffic Alert/Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) alerts and advisories, 
by category. 
07. All Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) warnings, by 
category. 
Takeoffs and landings 08. Landing gear position. 
09. Auto-brake setting. 
10. Brake pressure. 
11. Anti-skid releases. 
A brief explanation of the importance of recording these parameters for safety analysis 
was provided based on the experts' comments: 
1. Pilot-typed inputs to the Flight Management Computer (FMC) via the 
(Multifunction) Control Display Unit ([M]CDU): The FMC is "the computer" 
for the airplane; the CDU is its combined display and input device. This is the 
location of the pilot inputs for all aircraft performance and navigation. The 
information to be input by the pilots is generally obtained from the weight and 
balance documentation, dispatch-generated flight plans, ATC requests, desired 
weather avoidance, etc. 
2. Pilot selections of automated flight: The airplane can be flown in several 
modes of automation - (a) flight director on or off, (b) autothrottle on or off, 
(c) autopilot on or off, and (d) combinations thereof. 
3. The Flight Mode Annunciation (FMA): This display within the synchronous 
Primary Flight Displays of both pilots simultaneously announces what the 
airplane has been programmed to do and/or what it is doing. 
4. The page(s) displayed on the (M)CDU(s): The hierarchical arrangement of 
different performance and navigation categories, combined with a minimal 
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display size, creates multiple pages for each function. There often must be a 
"drilling down" to reach the correct page, which takes time and can be critical 
to inputs to the FMC. 
5. ILS Autoland Annunciations: This central display (typically on the glare 
shield) announces the conditions of the automated flight systems for landing 
conditions that are more weather-restrictive than Category I (i.e., Categories II 
and III). 
6. All Traffic Alert/Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) alerts and advisories, 
by category: The Resolution Advisory is the most serious TCAS event and is 
typically recorded. Alerts and less serious advisories have typically not been 
recorded. 
7. All Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) warnings, by 
category: A minimal number of more serious warnings have been recorded; 
there are many unrecorded warnings. 
8. Landing gear position: Commonly, landing gear position has been described 
and recorded in two states - up or down. Transitory states exist for seconds 
between the fully locked up and fully locked down landing gear positions. 
9. Auto-brake setting: There are multiple settings that control the stopping 
capability of the airplane, to be chosen based upon runway conditions and 
passenger comfort. 
10. Brake pressure: This measure of aircraft stopping capability has typically not 
been recorded. 
11. Anti-skid releases: This measure of each wheel's individual speed during 
braking applications has typically not been recorded. 
Demographics 
Three multiple choice items and one open-ended item were decided upon to 
briefly describe the group of participants. Item 12 asked for the best general classification 
of the respondent's U.S. airline; three options were provided. The participant was to 
choose only one from (a) major airline, (b) regional airline, and (c) other. To provide the 
maximum confidentiality and flexibility for the respondent, the instrument did not use 
any official, regulatory, or monetary classification. 
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Item 13 was open-ended, asking for the number of years that the participant's 
airline has utilized an FAA-approved FOQA program. The restriction to an FAA-
approved FOQA program provided information s to the number of airlines within the 
sample that have had an approved program. (The participant was provided the option of 
not answering this item, thereby possibly affecting the accuracy of this number.) 
Item 14 afforded the participants a choice of five areas within which their 
companies had focused the use of FOQA data for improvements. The left side of the 
scale was anchored by the choice of "Safety"; in the middle were three choices for "A 
Degree of Balance between Safety and Maintenance/Efficiency"; and the right anchor 
was the choice of "Maintenance/ Efficiency" The author's logic was to determine if the 
FOQA data has been used for safety, for operational improvements, or a combination 
thereof. (The utilization of the data has been debatable.) 
Item 15 asked which department made the decision about those parameters to be 
recorded in the airplanes. As previously discussed, there has been no study that has 
addressed the decision process for the implementation of FOQA parameters. The author 
provided three categories comprising the departments that have been directly related to 
FOQA analysis; (a) maintenance, (b) safety, and (c) operations. A fourth option -
"others" - was also available; this blank space afforded the respondent more flexibility, 
and perhaps accuracy. 
Multiple Choice Items 
Items 16 through 19 were listed as multiple choice items, although Item 19 was 
open-ended. Items 16 and 17 queried the respondents as to their opinions regarding the 
numbers of FOQA parameters currently be analyzed and the number of that might ideally 
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be analyzed. The choices for both items were (a) 10 to 20, (b) 21 to 40, (c) 41 to 60, (d) 
61 to 80, (e) 81 to 100, and (f) 100 plus. 
There has been some consensus in the industry that the majority of FOQA 
programs have not recorded the airplane tracking to a satisfactory resolution. For 
example, it has been impossible to distinguish (a) on which of the parallel runways the 
airplane landed, or (b) if any route deviation occurred. Item 18 requested participant 
preferences for the accuracy of the GPS Latitude/Longitude (Lat/Long) coordinates to be 
provided as a FOQA parameter consisting of degrees and decimals. The provided options 
were (a) 1000 ft, (b) 100 ft, (c) GPS/WAAS limitations (typically <10 ft), and (d) other. 
Although Item 19 might have better fit the demographics section, the author 
decided to leave it as the last item because it was considered to be sensitive. The 
objective of asking the participant to "Please provide an estimate of the maximum 
number of dollars that your company would be willing to spend to implement a new, 
ideal set of parameters" was to obtain a feel for how economically receptive the industry 
might be to the implementation of new FOQA parameters in their programs. 
General Comments 
A text box with unlimited capacity was provided for general comments. The 
participants could provide any comments, including ones related to (a) the questions, (b) 
the FOQA parameters, (c) the FOQA program, (d) the importance of the research, (e) 
their company's profile, etc. 
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Data Collection 
Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected because (a) the sample size 
was small and (b) the topic has not been widely known. The thesis committee was in 
agreement that there was the need for collecting qualitative data to increase both 
knowledge and accuracy. 
A total of 19 items (11 mixed-methods, 6 closed-ended, and 2 open-ended) were 
used. The researcher attempted to minimize the number of items to reduce the time 
impositions on the participants; however, the author made prudent decisions so as to not 
lose information considered essential for the research. The time necessary to answer the 
survey was estimated at 10-15 minutes. 
An e-mail (Appendix A) was sent to the sample on March 7, 2008, containing (a) 
an introduction to the research, (b) the attached survey, (c) instructions for filling out the 
survey, (d) the instructions for returning it to the author, (e) the author's contact 
information, and (f) the names of all the thesis committee members. The participants 
were given a period of 15 days to answer the survey and return it to the author. 
Five days before the closing date (March 22, 2008), the number of completed 
surveys that were returned had not achieved a satisfactory number for analysis. It was 
decided that an extension of the time period was necessary. On March 17, 2008, the 
author sent a second e-mail (Appendix C) that reminded those on the list of the 
importance of their participation. The final date was rescheduled as March 28, 2008. 
A small number of participants reported difficulties with filling in the Adobe 
Acrobat file. Consequently, a third e-mail (Appendix C) was sent on March 24, with the 
same survey in both Microsoft Word and Adobe Acrobat formats. The cutoff date 
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remained as March 28, 2008, at which time a satisfactory number of answers for analysis 
was achieved. 
Data Analysis 
The data were examined for usability. All the de-identified data (quantitative and 
qualitative) were aggregated in one Adobe Acrobat data set for storage and optimal 
visualization purposes. Additionally, the quantitative data were entered into the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for analysis. 
The qualitative responses were categorized and interpreted by the author (a) to 
complement the quantitative results, and (b) to obtain richer, detailed information from 
the industry. Since many of the qualitative data were directly related to the quantitative 
questions, qualitative responses were organized in categories that followed the list of 
items in the instrument. Direct and indirect quotes were presented in categorized tables. 
Comments provided in the last section were also categorized in accordance to parameters 
whenever appropriate. 
Other comments that reinforce the importance of this research were presented, but 
not directly interpreted as data. Although the author was able to identify the answers of 
each participant via their e-mail addresses, the confidentiality of the data was maintained. 
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Chapter IV 
RESULTS 
The survey was e-mailed to 40 individuals closely associated with FOQA in the 
U.S. air carrier industry. Fifteen of those individuals completed the survey, for a response 
rate of 37.50%; this was viewed as an acceptable response rate. Although the general rule 
has been that numerically higher response rates are desirable, Fink (2006) has cautioned 
that "the desired response rate tends to be entirely subjective" (p. 7). 
Demographics of the Participants 
The 15 respondents to the survey comprised 10 individuals from the U.S. major 
airlines, 2 individuals from the U.S. regional airlines, and 3 individuals from other 
entities associated with FOQA (manufacturers, researchers, etc.). Figure 15 depicts the 
makeup of the respondent group. 
Figure 15. The Survey Respondents in Three Categories. 
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The amount of an airline's annual revenue was not the criterion for the difference 
between the regional airlines and the major airlines. Rather, the criterion was the type of 
equipment flown (i.e., regional jet versus large transport). Both of the regional airline 
participants responded to Item 13, which asked for the number of years that their airline 
had been using an FAA-approved FOQA program. Of the 10 major airlines participants, 
9 reported the number of years they had experience with the FAA-approved FOQA 
program. Of the 2 regional airlines, both reported the number of years they had 
experience with the FAA-approved FOQA program. (One of the participants in the other 
category also reported 1 year with an FAA-approved FOQA program, which could have 
been attributable to contract work.) The airline participant descriptives for Item 13 (in 
years) were n =\ 1, M= 7.23, and SD = 3.55; hence, a wide 95% Confidence Interval (CI) 
of 4.85 to 9.61 existed for the mean. 
Item 14 asked the respondent to answer a 5-point (anchored by Safety and 
Maintenance/Efficiency) scale concerning the degree of balance for the primary use of 
the FOQA data. Table 13 has displayed the ordinal results for this degree-of-balance 
scale. 
Table 13 
The Degree of Balance between Safety and Maintenance/Efficiency for FOQA Data 
Safety Maintenance/ 
Efficiency 
n of responses 2 8 4 0 o 
The one-sample chi-square test value for the above distribution was 4.00,/? = .135. In 
addition to no statistical significance, the distribution was invalid for the chi-square test 
because more than 20% of the expected frequencies were less than 5 (Green & Salkind, 
2008). Both the mode and the median for the distribution were 8 responses. Figure 16 
provides a graphical summary of the utilization of FOQA data within the respondent 
companies. 
Maintenance/ 
Efficiency 
Figure 16. The Degree of Balance between Safety and Maintenance/Efficiency for 
FOQA Data. 
The next question inquired as to which airline department made the decisions as 
to the FOQA parameters to be recorded on the airplanes. Table 14 depicts the nominal 
values (n = 13) for the four categories provided by Item 15 (maintenance, safety, 
operations, and the catch-all other). 
Table 14 
Department That Made the Decisions Concerning Which Parameters for FOQA 
Maintenance Safety Operations Other 
n of responses 2 7 0 4 
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As with Item 14, the chi-square test was invalid for Item 15; had it been valid, its value 
would have been statistically insignificant. The mode value for the distribution was the 
safety department at 7 responses, comprising 54% of the answers, as shown in Figure 17. 
Figure 17 has provided a graphical summary of the decision-making departments 
concerning the parameters monitored by FOQA. 
Figure 17. Department Making the Decisions as to the Parameters for FOQA Monitoring. 
The Ideal Metrics 
Items 1 through 11 queried the respondents as to their confidence levels for 11 
proposed metrics that were believed could ideally be analyzed via FOQA parameters. 
Current FOQA parameters for these 11 metrics have provided no (or partial) infonnation 
concerning the complete status of these metrics. The confidence levels were designed as 
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six choices on a scale of equal intervals, with the highest choice representing 100 points 
of the "need to be included" in addressing some metrics via ideal FOQA parameters. The 
choices were: 
1. Does not need to be included = 0. 
2. Does need to be included = 20. 
3. Does need to be included = 40. 
4. Does need to be included = 60. 
5. Does need to be included = 80. 
6. Does need to be included = 100. 
For the purpose of treatment within the SPSS database, the choices were entered in 
accordance with the above intervals (i.e., 1 through 6 became 0 through 100). 
As shown in Appendix B, the metrics for items 1 through 11 were grouped under 
three headings on the instrument that represented three broader categories of concern for 
current FOQA analysis - automated flight (Items 1-5), warnings (Items 6 and 7), and 
takeoffs and landings (Items 8-11). The 11 metrics/items, as presented to the participants 
(and coded within the SPSS database and Table 15) were: 
1. Pilot-typed inputs to the Flight Management Computer (FMC) via the 
(Multifunction) Control Display Unit ([M]CDU). 
2. Pilot selections of automated flight. 
3. The Flight Mode Annunciation (FMA). 
4. The page(s) displayed on the (M)CDU(s). 
5. Instrument Landing System (ILS) autoland annunciations. 
6. All Traffic Alert/Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) alerts and advisories, 
by category. 
7. All Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) warnings, by 
category. 
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8. Landing gear position. 
9. Auto-brake setting. 
10. Brake pressure. 
11. Anti-skid releases. 
The survey instrument did not specifically refer to these 11 items as metrics. 
However, the levels of FOQA expertise among the chosen participants was such that they 
realized that some of the metrics could be represented via one parameter, whereas others 
would require more than one parameter to provide accurate measurement. 
Table 15 
Descriptives for the 11 Ideal FOQA Metrics/Parameters (N = 15 for All) 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
M 73.33 92.00 81.33 52.00 74.67 96.00 98.67 97.33 86.67 86.67 72.00 
SD 27.95 12.65 19.22 28.08 19.22 8.28 5.16 10.33 17.99 19.52 19.71 
LB 57.86 85.00 70.69 36.45 64.02 91.41 95.81 91.61 76.70 75.86 61.08 
UB 88.81 99.00 91.98 67.55 85.31 100.59 101.53 103.05 96.63 97.48 82.92 
hote LB = Lower Bound and UB = Upper Bound for the 95% CI for the means The means, the standard deviations, and the CIs arc 
for the participant response range of 0-100 (from the 6-point scale) 
Although the table of descriptives can provide rich information, many non-statisticians 
might have difficulties reading and interpreting the distributions. Therefore, a histogram 
and a detailed description have been provided for each of the 11 items. 
Quantitative and qualitative data were analyzed for each parameter. The 
qualitative data were analyzed in tables and categorized according to the (a) level of 
importance, (b) technical issues, and (c) presence in current FOQA programs. The 
majority of qualitative data was classified in one of the three categories. 
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Confidence Level 1: Pilot-Typed Inputs to the FMC via the (M)CDU 
Item 1 asked for the confidence level of the need for recording the pilot-typed 
inputs to the FMC via the (M)CDU. All 15 participants answered this item. Reponses 
ranged from 20 pts to 100 pts. The majority of participants (6) selected 100 pts. 
For statistical analysis, a CI of 95% was utilized. For Item 1, the mean (M) was 
73.33, the Standard Deviation (SD or a) was 27.95, the Lower Bound (LB) was 57.86, 
and the Upper Bound (UB) was 88.81. (If the industry was to be sampled again, there 
was a 95% probability that the mean would fall between the LB and the UB). Figure 16 
has illustrated the quantitative results for Item 1. 
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Figure 16. Quantitative Results for Pilot-Typed Inputs to the FMC via the (M)CDU. 
To compare with the quantitative result, the qualitative data were reported in 
Table 16. Four participants provided comments for Item 1. The comments where 
categorized as follows. 
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Table 16 
Qualitative Results for Pilot-Typed Inputs to the FMC via the (M)CDU 
Category Comments 
Level of Importance/ 
Validation 
Technical Issues 
Current Presence 
Very important to solve some of the human factors issues that cannot 
be solved today without crew contact. 
Important for incident investigation, however it would add little to 
trending and typical FOQA monitoring. 
To record this parameter may become a challenge since there have 
been quite a few variables with each input. 
This parameter might be difficult to collect. The data have been 
transmitted in a "Block" data transfer using the same ARINC 429 label 
for every three characters. Most acquisition units have not been able 
to capture data transferred in the block data format. The acquisition 
method has treated the individual label as a single unique parameter 
(or a parameter with a single meaning like Computed Airspeed). The 
acquisition unit has not known that with each label transmission a new 
set of characters have been transmitted. There have been limited 
interfaces on the acquisition unit which can handle block data transfer. 
New ones would have to be developed to capture these data. Ground 
station tools will have to be modified or developed to reassemble this 
block data into a meaningful message. 
Currently, this parameter has not been recorded in most cases. 
Currently, this parameter has been lacking in most airplanes. 
Confidence Level 2: Pilot Selections of Automated Flight 
Item 2 asked for the confidence level of the need for pilot selections of automated 
flight. All 15 participants answered this item. Responses ranged from 60 pts to 100 pts. 
The majority of participants (10) selected 100 pts. 
A CI of 95% was utilized. For Item 2, the Mwas 92, the SD was 12.65, the LB 
was 85, and the UB was 99. Figure 17 has illustrated the quantitative results for Item 2. 
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Figure 17. Pilot Selections of Automated Flight. 
To compare with the quantitative result, the qualitative data were reported in 
Table 17. Three participants provided comments for Item 2. 
Table 17 
Qualitative Results for Pilot Selections of Automated Flight 
Category Comments 
Level of Importance 
Technical Issues 
Current Presence 
• With the transient nature of FOQA analysis, more information has 
been better. 
• This parameter might not be very useful unless one is monitoring 
autopilot usage. 
• The greatest challenge for the analysis of this parameter might be to 
develop a complete picture of what's taking place on the flight deck. 
• To some extent, these parameters have been available today. 
• To save room, airlines have frequently skimped on these. 
• This parameter has been included on most airplanes in the U.S. today. 
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Confidence Level 3: The FMA 
Item 3 asked for the confidence level of the need for pilot selections of the FMA. 
All 15 participants answered this item. Responses ranged from 40 pts to 100 pts. The 
majority of participants (6) selected 100 pts. 
A CI of 95% was utilized. For Item 3, the A/was 81.33, the SD was 19.22, the LB 
was 70.69, and the UB was 91.98. Figure 18 has illustrated the quantitative results for 
Item 3. 
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Figure 18. Quantitative Results for the FMA. 
To compare with the quantitative results, the qualitative data were reported in 
Table 18. Two participants provided comments for Item 3. 
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Table 18 
Qualitative Results of the FMA 
Category Comments 
Level of Importance 
Technical Issues 
Current Presence 
• With the transient nature of FOQA analysis, more information has 
been better. 
• This parameter might be useful, but again, it might not be all that 
valuable. 
• The greatest challenge for the analyst might be to develop a complete 
picture of what is taking place on the flight deck. 
• To some extent, these parameters have been available today. 
Confidence Level 4: The Page(s) Displayed on the (M)CDU(s) 
Item 4 asked for the confidence level of the need for the page(s) displayed on the 
(M)CDU(s). All 15 participants answered this item. Responses ranged from 0 pts to 100 
pts. The majority of participants (5) selected 60 pts. 
A CI of 95% was utilized. For Item 4, the Mwas 52, the SD was 28.08, the LB 
was 36.45, and the UB was 67.55. Figure 19 has illustrated the quantitative results for 
Item 4. 
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Figure 19. Quantitative Results for the Page(s) Displayed on the (M)CDU(s). 
To compare with the quantitative result, the qualitative data were reported in 
Table 19. Three participants provided comments for Item 4. 
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Table 19 
Qualitative Results for the Page(s) Displayed on the (M)CDU(s) 
Category Comments 
Level of Importance • With the transient nature of FOQA analysis, more information has 
been better 
• This parameter might be important for incident investigation, however 
it would add little to trending and typical FOQA monitoring 
Technical Issues • The greatest challenge for the analyst might be to develop a complete 
picture of what have been taken place on the flight deck 
• This parameter might be difficult to collect The data have been 
transmitted in a "Block" data transfer using the same ARINC 429 label 
for every three characters Most acquisition units have not been able 
to capture data transferred in the block data format The acquisition 
method has treated the individual label as a single unique parameter 
(or a parameter with a single meaning like Computed Airspeed) The 
acquisition unit has not known that with each label transmission a new 
set of characters are transmitted There have been limited interfaces 
on the acquisition unit which can handle block data transfer New 
ones would have to be developed to capture these data Ground 
station tools will have to be modified or developed to reassemble this 
block data into a meaningful message 
Current Presence • To some extent, these parameters have been available today 
• This parameter has been currently lacking in most airplanes 
Confidence Level 5 ILS Autoland Annunciations 
Item 5 asked for the confidence level of the need for ILS autoland annunciations 
All 15 participants answered this item Responses ranged from 40 pts to 100 pts The 
majority of participants (6) selected 60 pts 
A CI of 95% was utilized For Item 5, the Mwas 74 67, the SD was 19 22, the LB 
was 64 02, and the UB was 85 31 Figure 20 has illustrated the quantitative results for 
Item 5 
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Figure 20. Quantitative Results for the ILS Autoland Annunciations. 
To compare with the quantitative results, the qualitative data were reported in 
Table 20. Two participants provided comments for Item 5. 
Table 20 
Qualitative for ILS Autoland Annunciations 
Category Comments 
Level of Importance 
Technical Issues 
• With the transient nature of FOQA analysis, more information has 
been better. 
• This parameter might have a general value. 
• The greatest challenge for the analyst might be to develop a complete 
picture of what has been taking place on the flight deck. 
Current Presence • To some extent, these parameters have been available today. 
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Confidence Level 6: All TCAS Alerts and Advisories, by Categoiy 
Item 6 asked for the confidence level of the need for all TCAS alerts and 
advisories, by category. All 15 participants answered this item. Responses ranged from 
80 pts to 100 pts. The majority of participants (12) selected 100 pts. 
A CI of 95% was utilized. For Item 6, the Mwas 96.00, the SD was 8.28, the LB 
was 91.41, and the UB was 100.59. (The practical UB was 100, the maximum value for 
the scale.) Figure 21 has illustrated the quantitative results for Item 6. 
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Figure 21. Quantitative Results for All TCAS Alerts and Advisories, by Category. 
To compare with the quantitative results, the qualitative data were reported in 
Table 21. Four participants provided comments for Item 6. 
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Table 21 
Qualitative Results for All TCAS Alerts and Advisories, by Categoiy 
Category Comments 
Level of Importance 
Technical Issues 
Current Presence 
• Very important - most ACs today have had the basics but not the 
up/down/monitor vertical would assist in TCAS investigations and 
compliance. 
• Absolutely necessary. 
• It would be nice to have a "one click" link to animate these files from 
within the ground analysis station. 
• Especially needed are target bearing and range, which almost no one 
records. 
• This is available by running the TCAS file through a separate program. 
• These have been recorded not as binary warnings but with numbers 0 
to 7. 
• Currently only the RA has been recorded, but not the direction. 
• This parameter has been tracked now. 
Confidence Level 7: All EGPWS Warnings, by Categoiy 
Item 7 asked for the confidence level of the need for all EGPWS warnings, by 
category. All 15 participants answered this item. Responses ranged from 80 pts to 100 
pts. The majority of participants (14) selected 100 pts. 
A CI of 95% was utilized. For Item 7, the Mwas 98.67, the SD was 5.16, the LB 
was 95.81, and the UB was 101.53. (The practical UB was 100, the maximum value for 
the scale.) Figure 22 has illustrated the quantitative results for Item 7. 
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Figure 22. Quantitative Results for All EGPWS Warnings, by Category. 
To compare with the quantitative results, the qualitative data were reported in 
Table 22. Four participants provided comments for Item 7. 
Table 22 
Quantitative Results for All EGPWS Warnings, by Categoiy 
Category Comments 
Level of Importance 
Technical Issues 
Current Presence 
• More fidelity would add value to safety analysis. 
• Absolutely necessary. 
• It would be nice to have a "one click" link to animate these files f rom 
within the ground analysis station. 
• To save space, some vendors have packaged all of these into one 
warning, which makes analysis impossible. 
• This parameter has been available by running the file through a 
separate program. 
• We currently have derived values from the recorded parameter of 
EGPWS. 
• This parameter has been tracked now. 
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Confidence Level 8: Landing Gear Position 
Item 8 asked for the confidence level of the need for the landing gear position. All 
15 participants answered this item. Responses ranged from 40 pts to 100 pts. The 
majority of participants (14) selected 100 pts. 
A CI of 95% was utilized. For Item 8, the M was 97.33, the SD was 10.33, the LB 
was 91.61, and the UB was 103.05. (The practical UB was 100, the maximum value for 
the scale.) Figure 23 has illustrated the quantitative results for Item 8. 
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Figure 23. Quantitative Results for Landing Gear Position. 
To compare with the quantitative results, the qualitative data were reported in 
Table 23. Four participants provided comments for Item 8. 
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Table 23 
Qualitative Results for Landing Gear Position 
Category Comments ^ _ _ 
Level of Importance • Need both "Up and Locked" and "Down and Locked/' 
• Totally necessary. 
Technical Issues • To record this parameter may require wiring on some airplanes. 
Parameter has not been basic. It might require an acquisition unit up 
date. 
Current Presence • This parameter has been available on every aircraft, today. 
Confidence Level 9: Auto-Brake Setting 
Item 9 asked for the confidence level of the need for auto-brake setting. All 15 
participants answered this item. Responses ranged from 60 pts to 100 pts. The majority of 
participants (9) selected 100 pts. 
A CI of 95% was utilized. For Item 9, the Mwas 86.67, the SD was 17.99, the LB 
was 76.70, and the UB was 96.63. Figure 24 has illustrated the quantitative results for 
Item 9. 
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Quantitative Results for the Auto-Brake Setting. 
To compare with the quantitative results, the qualitative data were reported in 
Table 24. Three participants provided comments for Item 9. 
Table 24 
Qualitative Results for Auto-brake Setting 
Category Comments 
Level of Importance 
Technical Issues 
Current Presence 
• If it was recorded, the number could provide interesting information. 
• To record this parameter may require wiring on some airplanes. This 
parameter has not been basic. It might require an acquisition unit up 
date. 
• Although brake pressure has been generally recorded, a deceleration 
versus pressure would tell you if auto-brake is on and at what setting. 
• It has not been installed. 
• This parameter has been available on most aircraft, today. 
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Confidence Level 10: Brake Pressure 
Item 10 asked for the confidence level of the need for brake pressure. All 15 
participants answered this item. Responses ranged from 40 pts to 100 pts. The majority of 
participants (9) selected 100 pts. 
A CI of 95% was utilized. For Item 10, the Mwas 86.67, the SD was 19.52, the 
LB was 75.86, and the UB was 97.48. Figure 25 has illustrated the quantitative results for 
Item 10. 
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Figure 25. Quantitative Results for Brake Pressure. 
To compare with the quantitative results, the qualitative data were reported in 
Table 25. Three participants provided comments for Item 10. There was no comment on 
the level of importance of this metric. 
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Table 25 
Qualitative Results for Brake Pressure 
Category Comments 
Level of Importance 
Technical Issues • Pedal pressures for CA and FOs has been recorded for our airplanes -
as has been the pressure applied to the individual brakes; a 
deceleration versus pressure would tell you if auto-brake is on and at 
what setting. 
Current Presence • This parameter has been available on most aircraft, today. 
• This has been a basic parameter on Boeing airplanes from Oct 91. 
Confidence Level 11: Anti-Skid Releases 
Item 11 asked for the confidence level of the need for anti-skid releases. All 15 
participants answered this item. Responses ranged from 40 pts to 100 pts. The majority of 
participants (10) selected either 60 pts or 80 pts. 
A CI of 95% was utilized. For Item 11, the Mwas 72, the SD was 19.71, the LB 
was 61.08, and the UB was 82.92. Figure 26 has illustrated the quantitative results for 
Item 11. 
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Figure 26. Quantitative Results for Anti-Skid Releases. 
To compare with the quantitative results, the qualitative data were reported in 
Table 26. Four participants provided comments for Item 11. 
Table 26 
Qualitative Results for Anti-Skid Releases 
Category Comments 
Level of Importance 
Technical Issues 
Current Presence 
Not sure of the value. 
To acquire this parameter, either record anti-skid activity or brake 
pedal pressure. 
It would be easier to record this parameter than trying to interpret 
brake pressures versus pedal input. 
Boeing has not instrumented this parameter. It may be difficult to 
obtain. 
The EMB 145 and the 777 have been equipped with wheel speed 
recordings. The correlations with brake pressure would tell you how 
the anti skid system is working. 
Number of Parameters for Analysis 
Items 16 and 17 respectively asked for a range of the number of parameters 
currently being analyzed by U.S. air carriers and the range to ideally be analyzed. Too 
many cells had expected frequencies of less than 5 for one-sample valid chi-square tests 
or the SPSS cross-tabulation (contingency table) procedure. All 15 respondents answered 
both items. The percentage of those that believed more than 100 parameters were 
currently being analyzed was 73.33. In terms of beliefs in how many parameters should 
be analyzed, 86.67% responded more than 100. Figure 27 has depicted and contrasted 
the answers for Items 16 and 17. 
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Figure 27. The Number of Parameters Currently Being Analyzed versus the Ideal 
Number of Parameters to Be Analyzed. 
Item 18 did not involve the number of parameters for analysis, but was a check 
for the internal reliability of the instrument. It was felt that all participants would desire 
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the maximum accuracy for the latitude and longitude coordinates furnished by the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) and the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS). However, 
one participant chose not to respond and one respondent was satisfied with 100-foot 
accuracy for latitude and longitude. (The GPS/WAAS accuracy was stated as typically 
<10 feet.) The percentage desiring the maximum accuracy available was 92.86. 
Item 19 was open-ended, addressing the perceived investment that a U.S. airline 
would be willing to make in a new, ideal set of FOQA parameters. Only four participants 
responded to this item with a number; nevertheless, there were some qualitative remarks, 
which have been reported in Table 27. 
Table 27 
The Perceived Investment that a U.S. Airline Would Be Willing to Make in a New, Ideal 
Set of FOQA Parameters 
Comments of Item 19 
• $0.00 
• We are satisfied with our current parameter set. $0.00 
• We would piggyback on other maintenance requirements. 
• Should be included as part of on-going maintenance fees. 
• The amount highly depends on cost benefit assessment of the final configuration. 
• Unknown 
• $1,000.00 per aircraft. 
• Less than $5,000.00 
• $10,000.00 
• Less than $80,000.00 
• Unknown 
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Chapter V 
DISCUSSION 
The intent of this study was to identify FOQA parameters that have not been 
widely used, whether by choice or not, to enhance air carrier safety. Two phases were 
necessary to identify a number of FOQA parameters that better address the industry 
needs: (a) to establish a list of candidate FOQA parameters, via a conference call with 
industry experts, and (b) to query the industry on the level of importance of the identified 
parameters. The conference call resulted in a list of 11 parameters that were included in 
the survey instrument. The survey respondents considered the majority of the listed 
parameters as potential contributors to aviation safety. 
Demographics of the Participants 
A total of 40 valid e-mails were sent with an acceptable response rate of 37.50%. 
The NTSB (2008) disclosed that 12 major airlines and 2 regional airlines have been 
managing FAA-approved FOQA programs. Demographics for this study's respondents 
consisted of participants from 10 major airlines and 2 regional airlines. Eleven of the 12 
airline respondents disclosed the number of years they have had experience with an FAA-
approved FOQA program. Although the number of respondents can potently be judged as 
small, Table 28 has depicted that the sample covered a minimum of 75% of the industry. 
Table 28 
Number of Airlines that Have Been Managing an FAA-Approved FOQA Program 
Airline Number of Companies Reported Number of Companies Obtained Percentage of 
Category by the NTSB from the Responses Responses/NTSB 
Major 12 9 75% 
Regional 2 2 IQQQ/0 
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The reported mean for the number of years that the participant companies have been 
managing an FAA-approved FOQA program was 7.23 (the FAA has been approving 
FOQA programs for less than 10 years) with a high variance. 
The utilization of the FOQA data has been debatable. There have been some 
criticisms that air carriers have tended to favor parameters associated with operational 
efficiency. Chapter IVs Table 13 and Figure 16 have indicated that FOQA data has not 
been used exclusively for safety. (The aforementioned dictates of capitalistic economies 
have been the drivers.) However, the use of data has focused more on the amelioration of 
safety hazards than improvements to maintenance/efficiency. None of the companies 
reported the utilization of FOQA data exclusively for operational improvements; 
however, 28.51% of the respondents for Item 13 have reported that their companies have 
used 50% of their FOQA data for safety improvements and the remaining 50% for 
maintenance/efficiency improvements. 
The preceding discussion of Item 14 led to some interesting quantitative results 
for Item 15. Anecdotal evidence had indicated that the safety departments had been 
suggesting FOQA parameters, but had not been the decision-makers for the list of FOQA 
parameters. The results were that the safety departments have made the decisions about 
which parameters needed to be monitored in 54% of the sampled companies. Other 
departments (including a combination of stakeholders) had been the decision-makers in 
31% of the sample, followed by the maintenance department with 15%. The operations 
department, by itself, was not recognized as a decision-maker for the parameters. The 
qualitative data indicated that the operations department did participate in concert with 
other departments during decision-making concerning FOQA parameters. 
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The chi-square test was invalid for Items 14 and 15. Although the results for these 
items had no statistical significance, the items provided an implication of the decision-
making processes for the implementation of FOQA parameters, an issue not addressed in 
earlier FOQA studies. 
The Ideal Metrics 
Statistical analysis was performed for Items 1 through 11, as planned, despite the 
sample size of 15. For the purpose of this thesis, it became important to provide some 
statistical explanation before discussing the results of Items 1 through 11 (the list of 
parameters). 
Per the Central Limit Theorem, the results would more accurately approach a 
normal distribution if the sample size had been greater (more than 30 has been the 
accepted norm). Furthermore, the greater the sample size, the smaller the variance, as 
illustrated in Figure 28's equation. 
a 
G- =—F= 
x
 Jn 
Figure 28. The Standard Error of the Mean. 
Gay, Mills & Airasian (2006) reported that "the major factor affecting the 
standard error of the mean is the sample size. As the size of the sample increases, the 
standard error of the mean decreases" (p. 340). Consequently, if the sample size were 
increased, the shape of the curve would tend toward taller and more skinny (the accepted 
statistical measure is kurtosis; leptokurtic describes the tall and skinny). 
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As reported in Chapter IV, Table 15 (p. 93), several parameters had a small 
variance. If the sample size had been larger, the variance would theoretically decrease 
further; this statistical concept has added support to the importance of the suggested 
parameters. 
Confidence Level I. Pilot-Typed Inputs to the FMC via (M)CDU 
This first parameter had M= 73.33, with a high variance. (The mode was 100 
pts.) It was interpreted that the industry judged that recording the pilot-typed inputs to the 
FMC via (M)CDU had an importance of 73.33 pts on the scale of 0 to 100. 
As stated in Chapter III, pilots have been required to input flight data to the FMC, 
which has resulted in the airplane performance during the flight. The analysis of this 
parameter could help the industry to understand some human factors issues, especially 
the ones concerning the human/machine interface. The pilots' workload in the cockpit 
could also be measured and procedures improved. 
This potential improvement was corroborated by the qualitative data, which 
reinforced the importance of monitoring this parameter as a means of solving some of the 
human factors issues that, to date, have been resolved only via the gatekeeper for crew 
contact. Some participants judged this parameter to be important only for accident 
investigation purposes. 
According to the comments, this parameter has not been recorded. Additionally, it 
was mentioned that there might be several technical difficulties to be overcome to include 
this parameter in FOQA analysis. 
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Confidence Level 2: Pilot Selections of Automated Flight 
The second parameter reported M= 92.00, with a low variance. (The mode was 
100 pts.) It was interpreted that the industry had judged that recording the pilot selections 
of automated flight has an importance of 92.00 pts on the scale of 0 to 100. 
As stated in Chapter III, the airplane can be flown by the pilots in several levels of 
automation (e.g., flight director on or off, autothrottle on or off, autopilot on or off, and 
combinations thereof). To record the selections of those modes could help the company 
improve training, standards, procedures and, consequently, safety. 
Contrasting with the quantitative, the qualitative data depicted that recording the 
pilot selections of automated flight would have more of a mid-importance. Additionally, 
one comment added that the automated-flight-parameter would be useful only if it were 
monitored in conjunction with the autopilot usage, which would be somewhat redundant. 
The respondents also reported that, to some extent, these parameters have been 
available in most of the airplanes; therefore, to implement it in daily FOQA analysis 
would be easy. However, airlines had frequently not recorded it to preserve the memory 
capacity (which can be smaller in some aircraft) for other parameters. 
Confidence Level 3: The FMA 
The third parameter had M= 81.33, with a high variance. (The mode was 100 
pts.) It was interpreted that the industry had judged that recording the FMA had an 
importance of 73.33 pts on the scale of 0 to 100. 
The FMA announces in both pilots' displays what the airplane has been 
programmed to do and/or what it is doing. As with the inputs in the FMC, recording this 
parameter would help the company to monitor if the pilots were optimally programming 
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and flying the airplane. If compared with the ASAP data, the analysis of the FMA would 
also help to monitor human factors issues, such as availability versus observability. 
The qualitative data reported similar importance to item 2. The greatest technical 
challenge for the analysis of the FMA might be to develop a complete picture of what 
was taking place on the flight deck. The respondents also reported that, to some extent, 
these parameters have been available for recording, today. 
Confidence Level 4: The Page(s) Displayed on the (M)CDU(s) 
Of the 11 parameters, the page(s) displayed on the (M)CDU(s) was the parameter 
that received the lowest level of importance. This parameter had M= 52.00, with a very 
high variance. (The mode was 60 pts.) It was interpreted that the industry judged that this 
parameter had an importance of 52.00 pts on the scale of 0 to 100. 
Due to the physical characteristics of the FMC and the (M)CDU, many pages are 
hierarchically arranged, which can hinder its programming during high workload phases 
of flight (e.g., approaches). The qualitative data reported that this parameter has been of 
greater importance to accident investigations than for FOQA analysis. Many technical 
difficulties were reported, such as the current use of the data frame concept. 
The comments on the current presence were somewhat contradictory. Some 
participants reported that this parameter has been available to certain extent, while others 
stated that this parameter has been lacking in most airplanes. 
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Confidence Level 5: ILS Autoland Annunciations 
The ILS autoland annunciation parameter had M= 74.67, with a high variance. 
(The mode was 60 pts.) It was interpreted that the industry judged that recording this 
parameter had an importance of 73.33 pts on the scale of 0 to 100. 
The crew has needed to be aware not only of the weather conditions and the 
airplane capabilities, but also how the airplane has been performing during a precision 
approach. The usability of this data would be similar to that of the FMA. 
The qualitative data indicated that recording this parameter might have a general 
value. A participant stated that the greatest challenge for the analyst might be to develop 
a complete picture of what had been taking place on the flight deck. It was also reported 
that the ILS autoland annunciation has been available to be recorded. 
Confidence Level 6: All TCAS Alerts and Advisories, by Category 
Most of the participants accorded that recording this parameter may be very 
valuable to safety improvements, with an M= 96.00 and a very small variance. (The 
mode was 100 pts.) The same result was emphasized by the qualitative data with 
remarkable comments, such as "Very important" and "Absolutely necessary"! 
Some participants reported that the resolution advisory has been the most serious 
TCAS event and it has typically been recorded. Other respondents stated that alerts and 
less serious advisories have been available not as binary warnings, but with numbers 0 to 
7 that need to be analyzed in separate software. 
Confidence Level 7: All EGPWS Warnings, by Category 
The EGPWS warnings, by category, was reported as the most desirable parameter 
for FOQA, with an M= 98.67 and a very small variance. (Only one participant did not 
choose 100 pts.) The same result was emphasized by the qualitative data with comments 
such as "Absolutely necessary"! 
The participants reported that this parameter has been available through the 
derivation of the values from the recorded parameter of EGPWS in separate software. 
Consequently, a "one click" link to animate the data in the GDRAS has been desirable. 
Additionally, the sample reported that, to save recording memory, vendors have been 
packing all of these warnings into one warning, which has made the analysis impossible. 
Confidence Level 8: Landing Gear Position 
As with the EGPWS warnings, to record the landing gear position has been 
reported as very desirable for purposes of safety. It had an M= 97.33, with a small 
variance. (The mode was 100 pts.) The qualitative data noted the need for both "up and 
locked" and "down and locked" status for the landing gear. 
The sample reported that the landing gear position has been available in every 
aircraft today with two states - up or down. Other positions (e.g. in transition) or status 
(e.g., locked) has not been recorded. Although this parameter has been totally necessary, 
to record it may require rewiring on some airplanes. 
Confidence Level 9: Auto-Brake Setting 
Analysis of this parameter would be helpful during investigation and prevention 
of runway excursions. Recording the auto-brake settings had an M= 86.67, with a high 
121 
variance. (The mode was 100 pts.) The qualitative data followed the quantitative results; 
the participants have indicated a mid-importance for this parameter. 
Technical issues for implementation of the parameter were mentioned, such as the 
need for wiring in some airplanes and an update of the acquisition unit. It was also 
suggested that analyzing a deceleration versus break pressure would tell if the auto-brake 
has been on and at what setting. (This would only be true if the runway were consistently 
noncontaminated.) 
There has been some qualitative disagreement about the current availability of 
this parameter. Some participants reported that this parameter has not been available; 
others reported that it has been available in most aircraft. 
Confidence Level 10: Brake Pressure 
Similar to Item 9, recording of the brake pressure would help during investigation 
of, and possibly prevent, landing accidents. This parameter had M= 86.67, with a high 
variance. (The mode was 100 pts.) There was no qualitative report on the level of 
importance of analyzing the brake pressure in FOQA programs. However, it was reported 
that this parameter has been available on most aircraft. 
Confidence Level 11. Anti-Skid Releases 
The data provided by recording the anti-skid releases would provide the same 
benefits as Items 9 and 10, especially with contaminated runways. Item 11 had an M= 
72.00, with a high variance. (The modes were 60 and 80 pts.) The qualitative data 
indicated no certainty about the importance of recording anti-skid releases. 
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The participants reported that this parameter has not been available. However, it 
would be easier to record it than trying to interpret brake pressures versus pedal input or 
wheel speed. 
Number of Parameters for Analysis 
Most of the participants reported that more than 100 parameters have been 
analyzed by current FOQA programs. However, the experts in attendance during this 
study's formative conference call agreed that the average for the number of parameters 
recorded has been in the range of 60 to 80 parameters. This difference can be a result of 
some participants interpreting a parameter not as a metric, but as an engineering unit. 
Results for this question became somewhat obscure. 
The Accuracy of the GPS Lat/Long Metric 
As expected, most of the participants chose to record the GPS tracking at the 
maximum resolution. However, several technical issues need to be overcome to have this 
parameter implemented for FOQA analysis, such as the current memory capacity, 
resolution, and frequency in which the GPS coordinates have been recorded. 
The Investment 
There has always been a sensitivity within the industry when discussing 
investments, for either efficiency or safety. As discussed in Chapter II, investments in 
safety have been a target for debate. Although the industry has judged the implementation 
of new parameters to be important, 50% of the participants reported that they would not 
be investing in new parameters. The remaining 50% reported that they could have some 
availability for small investments, as shown in Chapter IVs Table 27 (p. 112). 
General Comments 
As inferred from Figure 28, the smaller the sample size the greater the variance. 
The results provided by this research have shown that the industry has been very 
confident that most of the 11 suggested parameters need to be analyzed. If the sample 
size was larger, the variance should be reduced, meaning that the industry might attach 
more importance to discussion of the suggested parameters. 
The secondary aim of this study was to inform the aviation industry about the 
significance of discussing and, ultimately, adopting new FOQA parameters to enhance 
flight safety. This was achieved via both the study's preliminary conference call and the 
announcement of this study via e-mail to the industry sample. 
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Chapter VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The intent of this exploratory study was to identify FOQA parameters that have 
not been widely used, whether by choice or not, to improve safety. The knowledge 
needed to proceed with the thesis was acquired via the conference call comprising 
industry FOQA experts; as a result, the industry was queried as to the level of need for a 
suggested list of improved FOQA parameters. The 11 parameters derived from the 
conference call were judged favorably by the survey's industry participants. 
The participants did not evaluate any of the parameters as not being a significant 
contributor to air carrier safety. Most of the parameters had 100 pts as the mode. (The 
lowest mean [Item 4 at 52.00 pts] among the 11 parameters may have been attributable to 
some nonpilot participants unfamiliar with all of the flight deck nomenclature.) Figure 29 
has depicted the mean of the means for the 11 parameters. 
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Figure 29. Mean of the Means for the 11 Parameters. 
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Technical Requirements and Ready Availability 
Both the quantitative and qualitative data demonstrated that the survey 
respondents considered the 11 listed parameters as important, potential contributors to 
aviation safety. Implementation of some of the suggested parameters could be easily 
achieved via a reconfiguration of the DFDAU not requiring FAA approval. The desired 
(some already available on the data bus) parameters would then be output for recording 
by the QAR, or similar device, for analysis by the FOQA programs 
However, implementation of some of the suggested parameters was pointed-out 
as challenging to the industry because of technical difficulties that needed to be 
overcome. Those difficulties varied from the simple installation of wires and update of 
the DFDAU to a complete change of the data frame concept. Some of the parameters 
would potentially require devices to (a) acquire and record data at a higher frequency and 
(b) utilize a higher memory capacity, because of limits confronting the capacity of current 
equipment and the data frame. 
Some of the aforementioned technical difficulties have been overcome by new 
data recording architectures utilized by the newest aircraft, the B787 and the A380. 
However, some of the suggested parameters have continued to be technically impeded in 
the current airplanes (e.g., the B737NG, the B777, the A320, and the A330). 
The Utilization of FOQA Data 
As stated, the industry has been debating on (a) the utilization of FOQA data and 
(b) the department that has been the decision-maker for FOQA parameters. This research 
provided an implication for the anecdotal evidence. The respondents reported that most 
of the data have been used for safety improvements. Additionally, the majority of the 
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safety departments have been the decision-makers as to which parameters have been 
selected for monitoring by FOQA. 
Although Items 14 and 15 suggested what has been taking place in the industry, it 
is important to remember that the sample size was not satisfactorily large to measure both 
issues. The reported results can potentially change; the culture, the philosophy, the 
structure, and the goals of the companies vary (a) over time within one company and (b) 
among companies within the industry. As a result, both the utilization of the data and the 
department with the major influence on the decision for the parameters have been subject 
to change. 
Industry Amenability to Change 
The secondary aim of this study was to inform the aviation industry about the 
significance of discussing, and ultimately adopting, new FOQA parameters to enhance 
flight safety. The author deduced that this aim was achieved based on (a) the availability 
of the experts for the conference call on the parameters, (b) the positive feedback on the 
suggested parameters, and (c) the comments provided in the last section of the survey. 
All the expert participants of the conference call have agreed that the discussion 
for FOQA parameters that can contribute to safety was necessary. Some of the 
respondents also reported the same necessity via their comments. 
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Chapter VII 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The process of choosing FOQA parameters has followed a somewhat historical 
pattern; the process could be subjected to the current rationale for proactive safety, with 
some minimal criteria. Correspondingly, this thesis has demonstrated that the industry 
has become amenable to discussion of the FOQA methodology and its associated 
concepts. Accordingly, the foremost recommendation to the industry is to perform 
additional research and to confer as to the need for FOQA parameters that contribute to 
safety; as stated several times throughout this text, this has been the first study to date 
concerning this matter. 
Technical Issues 
The participants have pointed-out many technical issues which can lead to further 
studies of the difficulties. During the time that the technical issues would be solved by the 
engineers, the FOQA programs' capabilities for the changing of, or the addition of new, 
FOQA parameters may arrive. However, the engineers cannot guess as to the needs of the 
industry needs. De novo, discussion of the need for improved safety FOQA parameters 
has become requisite. 
The Investments 
As this study occurred (2007/2008), the U.S. aviation industry has been in the 
throes of economic crisis. Due to the increasing price of the fuel and a recessionary 
economy, U.S. consumers have opted for less travel; the demand for air transportation in 
the U.S. has been waning. Consequently, the air carriers have been restructuring and 
128 
virtually all new investment has been curtailed or halted. New investments in safety have 
been affected. 
However, in a better economic scenario, a cost/benefit analysis on investments in 
new FOQA parameters (the ones suggested either in this or in other study) is strongly 
recommended. The investments in safety have always been debatable, a cost-benefit 
analysis might justify the investment in improved FOQA parameters, or the benefits may 
be imperceptible. 
The Parameters to Be Monitored 
This study has implicated that the industry has used most of the FOQA data, but 
not all, for safety improvements. Due to the capitalistic rules of the air carrier industry, it 
is recommended that airlines equate the savings and the costs associated with safety in 
making the correct decisions concerning the parameters that need to be monitored. Do be 
mindful of the fact that a single, unique accident has historically removed several air 
carriers from the business. By monitoring the correct parameters, the aviation industry 
can improve its level of safety. 
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APPENDIX A 
Introductory E-mail 
Date: 03-07-08 
Subject: The Ideal Parameters for FOQA Analysis 
Those parameters analyzed in U.S. FOQA programs have evolved from somewhat less 
than the ideal for the analyses of today and tomorrow. A Master of Science in 
Aeronautics (MSA) thesis at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) is 
attempting to address the current situation as a first step toward an enhanced list of 
FOQA parameters that could become the standard for U.S. air carrier programs. The 
aircraft to be considered for these parameters are those of today that will not be retired 
prior to the year 2023 and those that will be entering the U.S. fleets during the next 15 
years. 
The attached questionnaire has been designed to be completed in 10-15 minutes. We 
would appreciate your completion of the questionnaire (utilizing check marks in the 
appropriate boxes and including any of your most valuable comments) and returning it to 
Giorge via e-mail (giorgetsuruta@yahoo.com.br) within 10 days. Unlimited text is 
available within the .pdf comments areas. However, if you are more comfortable writing 
in the body of an e-mail to Giorge, please do so. If you are uncomfortable with answering 
a question, please skip that question and return what you have completed to Giorge. 
Thesis participants: 
GIORGE M. L. TSURUTA - MSA Student 
HAN C. WU Latin America Product Support Manager, SAGEM Avionics 
CARL HALFORD - Technical Engineer in MITRE's ASIAS and SMS projects 
Captain ROGER MASON - American Airlines and ERAU Adjunct Professor 
Dr. THOMAS R. WEITZEL - Associate Professor, ERAU 
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The Questionnaire 
EMBRY-RIDDLE 
A E R O N A U T I C A L U N I V E R S I T Y 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN AERONAUTICS 
T H E I D E A L P A R A M E T E R S F O R 
F L I G H T O P E R A T I O N A L Q U A L I T Y A S S U R A N C E ( F O Q A ) A N A L Y S I S 
The first 11 questions/items ask for your confidence level in terms of a degree of "Need to be Included" as a parameter for 
FOQA analysis The 6-pomt scale (0 through 5 representing confidence levels from 0 to 100) is defined as follows 
0 = Does not Need to be Included 
1 = 20 pts of Need to be Included 
2 = 40 pts of Need to be Included 
3 = 60 pts of Need to be Included 
4 = 80 pts of Need to be Included 
5 = Does Need to be Included 
Each of these 11 items allows space for comments, which would be most valuable for the thesis 
ITEMS 1-11 (Confidence level from 0 to 5; add comments) 
AUTOMATED FLIGHT 0 1 2 3 4 5 
01 Pilot-typed inputs to the Flight Management Computer (FMC) via the (Multifunction) D D D D D D 
Control Display Unit ((M]CDU) 
Comments 
02 Pilot selections of automated flight. D D D D D D 
Comments 
03 The Flight Mode Annunciation (FMA). • • Q • • • 
Comments 
04 The page(s) displayed on the (M)CDU(s). D D • D • D 
Comments 
05 ILS Autoland Annunciations • • D • • • 
Comments 
WARNINGS 0 1 2 3 4 5 
06 All Traffic Alert/Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) alerts and advisories, by D D D D D D 
category 
Comments 
07. All Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) warnings, by category D D D D D D 
Comments 
Page 1 of 3 (Continues in next pages ) 
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, EMBRY-RIDDLE 
^ d f ^ K < » r A E R Q N A U T I C A l U N I V E R S I T \ 
MASTER 01 S« if N< E IN Al 
T H E I D E A L P A R A M E T E R S F O R 
F L I G H T O P E R A T I O N A L Q U A L I T Y A S S U R A N C E ( F O Q A ) A N A L Y S I S 
TAKEOFFS AND LANDINGS 0 1 2 3 4 5 
08 Landing gear position D D D D D D 
Comments 
09 Auto-brake setting D D D D D D 
Comments 
10 Brake pressure D D D D D D 
Comments 
11 Anti-skid releases • Q • • • • 
Comments 
ITEMS 12-15 (Demographics) 
12. What is the best general classification of your U.S. airline? 
• Major Airline • Regional Airline • Other 
13. Number of years that your airline has utilized an FAA-approved FOQA program: 
14 At your airline, FOQA data is primarily used for the improvement of 
Safety A Degree of Balance between Maintenance/ Safety and Maintenance/Efficiency Efficiency 
• • • • • 
15. Which department makes the decision about those parameters to be recorded on the airplanes? 
• Maintenance • Safety D Operations • Other: 
Page 2 of 3 (Continues in next pages ) 
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MACTEK OF 5( IEN< ( IN AERONAUTICS 
THE IDEAL PARAMETERS FOR 
FLIGHT OPERATIONAL QUALITY ASSURANCE (FOQA) ANALYSIS 
ITEMS 16-18 (Multiple Choice) 
16. To the best of your knowledge, a range for the number of FOQA parameters currently being analyzed by U.S. air 
carriers is 
• 10-20 • 21-40 • 41-60 • 61-80 Q 81-100 • 100 plus 
17 To the best of your knowledge, an ideal range for the number of FOQA parameters to be analyzed by US air carriers 
would be 
D 10-20 • 21-40 • 41-60 • 61-80 • 81-100 Q 100 plus 
18. Please provide your preference for the accuracy of the GPS Lat/Long coordinates to be provided as a parameter 
consisting of degrees and decimals: 
• 1000 ft • 100 ft • GPS/WAAS limitations (typically <10 ft) • Other. 
19. Please provide an estimate of the maximum number of dollars that your company would be willing to spend to 
implement a new. ideal set of parameters 
GENERAL COMMENTS - Any and All 
Page 3 of 3 
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Date: 03-17-08 
Subject: The Ideal Parameters for FOQA Analysis 
Dear FOQA Parameters Respondent, 
Because of your FOQA expertise, you were selected to receive my email and its survey 
of March 7, 2008. The limited number of U.S. airline FOQA experts has created a 
relatively short list of potential survey respondents. The 10-15 minutes estimate for 
survey completion was designed to best fit your busy schedule. 
For years, those involved in FOQA programs have been aware of the need for an 
improved parameter list. As information sharing has been adopted, through programs like 
the DNFA and ASIAS, this has become even more important and evident. Your valuable 
input in creating this parameter list is much needed. 
The survey return date has been extended to March 28 in an attempt to capture as many 
expert answers as possible. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to email me 
(giorgetsuruta@yahoo.com.br). Because I am currently in Brazil, the best U.S. phone 
contact until my return on March 26 is Tom Weitzel at 386 760-2220 
(trweitzel@cfl.rr.com). 
Thank you very much for your assistance. 
Sincerely, 
Giorge M. L. Tsuruta 
giorgetsuruta@yahoo.com.br 
tsuru299@erau.edu 
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Date: 03-24-08 
Subject: The Ideal Parameters for FOQA Analysis 
Dear FOQA Parameters Respondent, 
It has been brought to our attention that there can be a problem with returning the survey 
via the Acrobat Reader. Accordingly, we are attaching the Word (2003), multi-page 
version of the survey. This version can be completed and "Saved As" a .doc before 
attaching to a return email to me. 
We apologize for any difficulties you may have experienced. Hopefully this Word format 
will enable you to participate in the survey. The closing date for the survey continues to 
be March 28. 
The same .pdf version is also attached. Alternatively, depending upon your Acrobat 
program, you may be able to complete it and "Save As" successfully. The completed .pdf 
can then be attached to a return email to me. 
Again, if you have any comments or questions, please do not hesitate to email me 
(giorgetsuruta@yahoo.com.br). Because I am in Brazil until March 26, the best U.S. 
phone contact until my return to Daytona Beach continues to be Tom Weitzel at 386 760-
2220 (trweitzel@cfl.rr.com). 
Thank you very much for your assistance. 
Sincerely, 
Giorge M. L. Tsuruta 
giorgetsuruta@yahoo.com.br 
tsuru299@erau.edu 
